Gloomsters buried the euro too soon

Ótimo artigo do Philip Stephens, FT, analisando as previsões equivocadas sobre o futuro da Zona do Euro.

The euro crisis has receded, leaving behind quite a lot of egg on (mostly) Anglo-Saxon faces. For much of 2012 the air was thick with predictions of imminent catastrophe. Brits and Americans were in the vanguard of the gloomsters. In the event, reports of the demise of the single currency proved greatly exaggerated.
The most ardent europhile would struggle to argue that European governments have met all the big economic tests. The continent still boasts precious little growth, chronic unemployment and a pile of public debt. The banks are in far from rude health, and there are political battles aplenty ahead. That said, finance ministers no longer spend every waking hour checking the spreads on sovereign debt. Private funding is flowing back towards the periphery.
It is worth exploring where the pessimists went wrong. The answers provide a clue as to the future architecture of the eurozone and the political shape of Europe.
The obvious mistake was to underestimate the political will of European leaders to keep the show on the road. Peripheral states, it was said, would not have the resolve to sustain brutal austerity measures. Riots would spread from Athens to Rome, Madrid and Lisbon. Germany lacked the domestic political support needed to underwrite the debtors.
This argument was not without merit. Greece, in particular, looked as if it was sliding out of the monetary union. Spain seemed to face an impossible task in restoring a crippled financial system. The peripheral economies were hopelessly uncompetitive. German public opinion was singularly hostile to bailing out the “Club Med” nations.
What was missing in most of the British, and quite a lot of the American, analysis, however, was an appreciation of the force of politics. The myriad efforts to support the euro have been far from elegant. Constant hesitation has raised their cost and reduced their efficiency. But behind the austerity, the bailouts and the new funding mechanisms has lain serious determination.
For many in Britain, as we heard the other day from Prime Minister David Cameron, the EU is about the single market. For the rest it is a political project – the guarantor of Franco-German reconciliation, of freedom in the former dictatorships of left and right, and of a European voice in a world where power is fast heading east. During one sticky episode last year, I heard a German official say how lucky it was Britain had stayed out of the euro. Had it joined, it would have run away again at the first whiff of cordite.
The turning point came when Chancellor Angela Merkel concluded that a eurozone collapse would risk the break-up of the EU. Germany would lose the strategic framework for its security and prosperity. It is striking how the national discourse changed within a matter of months, The conversation has shifted from “feckless” Greeks to the euro’s vital role in guarding German interests.
Ms Merkel decided during the late summer that it was too risky to allow Greece to leave. At about the same time, she sided with the European Central Bank against the Bundesbank. Mario Draghi, ECB president, got the go-ahead to guarantee the bonds of peripheral states. Once the ECB had positioned itself as lender of first resort, the markets were left stranded on the wrong side of an unwinnable fight.
The other mistake was conceptual – the product of dry economic theory and excessively tidy minds. The eurozone, pessimists said, faced a simple binary choice. It could become an economic and political union – a united states of Europe – or it was doomed. Since it was obvious that Germany, France and the rest were not about to abandon their national identities, it was easy to conjecture that the euro was a currency without a future.
The trouble is that what the French call the construction of Europe does not conform to existing political models. The EU marries the supranational and the national. The euro was cast in the same mould. Sure, it was a mistake not to provide for more economic integration at the outset. And, yes, sustaining the single currency will eventually require a sizeable leap towards fiscal federalism. But neither the “political union” envisaged by Germany nor the “economic government” proposed by France imagine the abolition of the nation state. Nor need they.
A soon-to-be published study by economists at the International Monetary Fund shows that even full-blooded political federations vary widely in the distribution of economic power between the central government and constituent states. Few, if any, go as far as offering the centralised guarantee of borrowing that is implied by proposals that the eurozone should issue eurobonds.
Barack Obama has grasped this. When he was briefed about German reluctance to write a blank cheque, the US president said he well understood Ms Merkel’s reticence. After all, US states are not expected to bail out indebted neighbours.
The end point for the eurozone looks likely to be a much tighter economic union but one falling short of political federalism. Nemat Shafik, the deputy managing director of the IMF, put it well at a recent gathering in Paris of the Franco-British Colloque. Europe’s destination probably lay in the “muddy middle of variable geometry and hybrids between federal and intergovernmental solutions”.
The euro still confronts formidable political and economic challenges – though those who blame everything on the single currency must also explain why Britain is in a bigger mess. No one can be sure the currency will survive in perpetuity. History says that monetary unions often break up. But at least we know now that the politicians will not give up without a pretty ferocious fight.

Fonte: FT

Fritura do Guido ou do Tombini?

Depois de dois dias de baixa, o dolar teve um dia de alta: seria o inicio de um período de volatilidade, reflexo da divêrgencia entre Bacen e Fazenda? Guido reafirmou, nesta quarta-feria, que a política cambial veio para ficar, ou seja sua função é proteger a produção industrial nacional. O Bacen parece ter opinião diferente: o câmbio deve ser usado para controlar os preços. Quem tem razão? Depende da definição de prioridade da política econômica: inflação roçando o limite da meta parece ser a opção da atual administração, dai não ter o mesmo sentido usar o cambio para abater a inflação, já que para tanto seria necessario levar o cambio para, pelo menos, 1,90. Neste caso, melhor usa-lo como instrumento de política industrial. Não gosto nenhum pouco da idéia de proteção, indevida, à setores ineficientes da industria nacional. Melhor seria priorizar a convergencia da inflação para a sua meta. Esta no entanto, não parece ser a prioridade do governo.

Confirmada a diferença de opinião entre o Bacen e a Fazenda, coloca-se uma serie de perguntas, que podem, no entanto, serem agrupadas em uma única questão básica: quem esta sendo fritado? Guido ou Tombini? Nenhum dos dois, na avaliação do mercado, é uma Brastemp, mas se for inevitável fazer uma escolha, o derrotado seria o Guido. Ele é que está na frigideira, com o fogo mais alto.

Interview with Julian Reiss, author of Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction

Entrevista com autor de um novo livro sobre Filosofia da Economia. É um tema fascinante, infelizmente ignorado pela maioria da profissão, apesar da contribuição de importantes economistas mainstream a esta área de pesquisa.


1. Could you give a brief description of the field of philosophy of economics so that it makes sense to non-philosophers, and identify some of the core issues the field takes on?

The philosophy of economics concerns all the questions every economist ought to think about but normally doesn’t because they are regarded as unimportant or unfashionable by the profession. They are about the – moral, methodological, metaphysical – foundations of economic science. Here is an example. Economics is, as is well known, based on a theory of rational choice. This theory assumes that people have stable and transitive preferences over all available alternatives. An economist qua scientist will take the theory as given and explore its consequences. An economist qua philosopher – a philosopher of economics – will challenge its fundamental assumptions. Does rationality really require the existence of stable, transitive and complete preferences? Do people as a matter of fact have such preferences, and how can we know? If not, might the assumption nevertheless be innocuous and useful for explaining economic behavior and predicting future events?

In the book I divide the philosophical issues raised by economic science into three broad kinds. The first is concerned with the foundations of economic theory. Issues here concern the nature of rationality, whether people do and ought to act rationally as portrayed by the theory, whether there are any economic laws, what’s the nature of causal relations, of mechanisms and so on. The second is concerned with methodology. Methodologists, unsurprisingly, study the methods employed by scientists in order to address their questions. They ask how these methods work, about their presuppositions and the range of questions they can address. Important methods economists use are the measurement of economic indicators (such as inflation, unemployment and GDP), regression methods, economic experiments and randomized field experiments. The third is concerned with the ethical aspects of economics. Whether economic science can and should address ethical issues is particularly contentious among economists. Philosophers are less reserved and ask, for instance, about the nature of well-being, whether or not a given distribution of economic resources is just, whether there are any moral limits to the market and whether or not the government should make decisions for its citizens if doing so improves their well-being.

2. How did philosophy of economics develop? Are there any key figures or contributions that all readers should be aware of?

There are two ways to answer this question because the philosophy of economics is at the same time an ancient and a very recent discipline. It is ancient in that the world’s greatest economists beginning with Aristotle were also or mainly philosophers, and many of their contributions should be classified as contributions to the philosophy of economics rather than the science of economics. Understood in this broad way, Aristotle, Adam Smith, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, William Stanley Jevons, John Maynard Keynes, Amartya Sen and many others are all among the key philosophers of economics.

On the other hand, with the increasing specialization and professionalisation of academic disciplines that occurred in the nineteenth century, economics was separated from philosophy and developed, especially after the Second World War, a mainstream paradigm that was hostile to philosophical reflection. At the same time, philosophers of science were mainly interested in natural science and thus tended to ignore economics and other social sciences. It is only in the last 30 or so years that we can once more experience a mutual interest and exchange, and witness the development of academic institutions that focus on the intersection of economics and philosophy. In that sense, then, the discipline is a novel one. There are now a number of professional philosophers of economics in this narrower sense. I was personally greatly influenced by the work of Nancy Cartwright, Mary Morgan and Daniel Hausman, but there are of course others.

3. Has the recent economic crisis harkened in an important, perhaps transformative, moment for philosophy of economics?

It has indeed. Not so much in challenging fundamental beliefs philosophers of economics hold but in bringing methodological issues to the attention of economists and thereby opening entirely new ways of doing philosophy of economics. We now hear Paul Krugman publicly complain that many economists ‘mistake beauty for truth’, Joseph Stiglitz accuse his colleagues of ‘murdering the American economy’ by using bad idealisations in their models and Daron Acemoglu proclaim that ‘The financial crisis is an embarrassment for economic theory’. Many of the issues they are raising, for instance about the unrealisticness of assumptions in economic models, have been discussed by philosophers of economics for many years. But they have tended to do so for the most part in isolation from economic practice (which has no doubt been partly due to the resistance of economists to engage in philosophical debate). With some luck future work in philosophy of economics will be done in closer collaboration with economists, motivated by practical concerns, and relevant to economists’ day-to-day work.

4. Do you think that the changes you mention in (3) will have a lasting impact on the direction of philosophy of economics?

Yes – if the criticisms of Krugman, Stiglitz, Acemoglu and others are taken seriously by economists, and philosophers of economics stop asking abstract-philosophical questions and turn towards economic practice.

5. In what ways does philosophy of economics puncture holes in common economic assumptions?

One has to distinguish between valid criticism of economic assumptions and their uptake by economists. The arguments philosophers of economics have given to the effect that economists cannot ignore engagement with ethics, that the revealed-preference theory is untenable, that new causal relations cannot be established without making strong causal background assumptions and many others are compelling. And yet, they continue to be ignored by many, if not most, professional economists. Philosophers find this situation lamentable, and understandably so. To some extent we have to blame ourselves. Not only do philosophers tend to address issues at too high a level of abstraction, they also oftentimes use specialist jargon that is difficult to understand outside the profession. We have to learn to communicate better, to focus on issues that are practically relevant, and, if possible, to work on these issues jointly with economists. Unless that happens, there might be numerous philosophical holes in theory, but they might not affect the way economics is practiced.

6. What can philosophy learn from economics?

A number of things. Let me focus on two areas here, one where economics has already had a great influence on the way philosophy is practised, and another where there is still room for improvement. The use of models, especially mathematical models, has proven extremely fruitful in economics. Models create parallel worlds within which claims can be established rigorously. Having to build a model and to derive claims within its confines demands of the modeler to be exact in certain ways, to make implicit background assumptions explicit, to use the same concepts from the beginning to the end of a derivation and so on. While certainly not unexceptionable, these are virtues in many contexts. Formal tools such as mathematical modeling, the proof of representation theorems etc. have become more popular in recent philosophy, and economics has oftentimes been an especially important source of inspiration. John Broome’s books can be regarded as paradigmatic of this kind of work. I do not think that this is the only good way to do philosophy, but it unquestionably has a lot to speak for it.

The other area concerns aims. Economics is, no doubt, in part a policy science. That is, economists confidently use their tools to make policy recommendations on a broad range of subjects. And, for better or worse, their voices are heard. Philosophers of science generally, and philosophers of economics are no exception, tend to take a more Aristotelian, contemplative stance towards science and society. But they shouldn’t. Philosophical issues of economics are of great practical importance. This is most salient in the area of ethical aspects of economics but true throughout. Methodological issues are oftentimes interwoven with ethical ones. As philosophers of economics we shouldn’t leave the political field to economists (and philosophers specializing in other areas such as ethicists) but ourselves take a stance and think harder about the applied areas of economics.

7. Does economics require prior formal education in philosophy? If so, how does this affect the discipline’s position in the academy? Along these lines, perhaps, does the philosopher of economics have a double-pedagogical role: to explain adequately the philosophical issue and explain the economic issue under discussion?

I don’t think economics necessarily requires prior education in philosophy, but some philosophy (along with other humanities such as history) should be part of the economics curriculum. There’s a deplorable tendency of economics departments to shut down courses in the history and methodology of economics, and with them departmental research groups. This would be a bad idea even if economics was a body of incontrovertible truths. But it isn’t. Foundational assumptions in economics can and ought to be challenged constantly. As social practices evolve, as societal goals and values change, and they constantly do, traditional assumptions become outdated and need to be revised. Philosophy and history are necessary to understand these developments, and they can help economists to become more reflective and better grounded scientists.

8. Does philosophy of economics address problems that would warrant interest from students and scholars outside of philosophy?

At least some of the problems philosophy of economics are of very broad interest. Think of the moral limits of the market. Should there be markets in kidneys or blood? Do tuition fees affect the way university education is conceived by students? Is paying money to dumpster the queue morally problematic? These are issues that affect almost anyone. Or consider paternalism. Should the government intervene so people eat more healthily? Is eating healthily really good for us? What if it is good for some but not for others? (As an aside, the book talks about foie gras in various places.) Philosophy of economics isn’t a purely academic discipline.

9. How do economists and philosophers view the field of economics differently? Has there been much recent dialog between philosophers and economists? If so, what was the goal or the result?

When I teach philosophy to economics students I oftentimes notice an unease they have with the way philosophers regard almost any ‘truth’ as tentative, subject to future revision, local, and relative to a context at hand. I’d go on and on, say, about how great a philosopher David Hume was and how important his insights about causation, only to show, at the end of the lecture, how he got it (almost) all wrong. They find that frustrating. This way of thinking should not, however, be altogether unfamiliar to economics students because models, which as I noted above are all over the place in economics, are tentative, erroneous, local, purpose-driven constructs. This is not, however, how models seem to be taught in economics departments.

This, then, is one important difference, and there are many more. These differences oftentimes make communication across the disciplines and therefore dialog difficult. I was recently made fun of at an economics conference for using the word ‘ontology’ and for making a point about causality by quoting Mill. The economist in question said that he didn’t understand ‘ontology’ and Mill was better on liberty than on causality. This was perhaps an extreme case, but it shows that economists and philosophers of economics have some way to go to establish fruitful dialog.

On the other hand, there are many reasons to be optimistic. More and more philosophers of economics have dual backgrounds these days, PhD theses are jointly supervised and we see some collaboration on research projects. It is just a matter of time that economics and philosophy of economics draw more closely together.

10. How does philosophy of economics affect assumptions and research in other fields like moral philosophy and moral psychology?

I wouldn’t say that philosophy of economics affects these other fields but rather that parts of moral philosophy and moral psychology constitute branches of philosophy of economics or at least that the boundaries between the fields are very fluid. Take well-being as an example. Well-being is clearly a core concern of moral philosophy. But it is also important to welfare economics. So shall we say research on well-being is moral philosophy when done by a moral philosopher (such as James Griffin or Roger Crisp), economics when done by an economist (such as Partha Dasgupta or Angus Deaton) and philosophy of economics when done by a philosopher of economics (such as Dan Hausman or Michael McPherson)? That doesn’t make sense. A researcher interested in well-being will build on results in all three fields, and his or her work will be relevant to all three.

11. You write in the Introduction to Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction that “Philosophers of economics are philosophers whose work focuses on the theoretical, methodological and ethical foundations of economics.” Does philosophy of economics itself operate according to a standardized theoretical/methodological/ethical foundation or does that depend on the particular philosopher? Are there philosophical approaches to economics-related issues (i.e., John Searle’s work on social ontology) which are not considered philosophy of economics proper because they do not adhere to such a standardized foundation, if it does in fact exist?

Philosophy of economics in the narrow sense is a young discipline, so little if anything is standardised. Philosophers of science oftentimes distinguish the epistemic and metaphysical aspects of science, i.e., the ‘How can we know?’ and the ‘What is there?’. This division leaves out ethics, which is important to all science and to economic science in particular. Moreover, economics is based on a theory of rational action, so one has to include rationality as well. In the book I aim to be comprehensive but nevertheless to provide an overall structure and narrative. The division theory-methodology-ethics is the result. What I call foundations of economic theory includes issues concerning rational action but also traditional metaphysical issues such as laws and causality. Social ontology à la Searle could have been included here, but it is largely irrelevant to practising economists, so I left it out. What I call the methodological foundations includes the traditional epistemic issues of philosophy of science but I address them at the more concrete level of particular methods economists actually use. The same goes for the ethical foundations. Many of them have their counterparts in traditional moral philosophy, but in the book they are addressed in the concrete context of welfare economics.

12. How are the more “pop cultural” philosophy of economics texts—the work of Malcolm Gladwell, for example—received by philosophers of economics?

There is clearly an interest in this kind of literature among philosophers of economics. I remember very early in my career I attended a conference, organized by philosopher-economist Kevin Hoover, where Sylvia Nasar, author of A Beautiful Mind (a popular book about the life of John Nash) gave a keynote. My former colleague at the Erasmus Institute of Philosophy of Economics, Jack Vromen, organized a great conference on the ‘economics made fun’ genre (work such as Freakonomics, The Armchair Economist or More Sex is Safer Sex) a few years back. My own book ends with a chapter on Nudge. Nudge is, of course, also a serious policy proposal, but the book is certainly very popular and some of its ideas (or expressions – think of the image of a parent elephant ‘nudging’ its baby elephant) have become part of pop culture.

13. What do you consider to be the future of philosophy of economics? What are the most pressing questions facing the discipline today?

If we continue to do good philosophical work but in a manner that is relevant to economics, is taken up by economists because it helps to address their concerns, and that can contribute to sound economic policy making, we’ll face a bright future.

14. In your opinion, what philosopher of economics has had the greatest impact on the discipline in the last 100 years?

Without a doubt Amartya Sen.

15. And finally, a more lighthearted question: given their concern with the behavior of individuals in certain economic situations, do philosophers of economics gamble? Why or why not?

There must be some ways to exploit humans’ decision-making follies, but philosophers tend to be too well behaved to actually do it, or even consider doing it for that matter. Seems like a good idea to me though, so off I go.

Fonte: Routledge

Dolar e Zona do euro....

O dolar começou a semana em queda de 1,33%, fechando o dia em R$2,001, a menor cotação desde 2 de julho do ano passado. É prematuro ver neste comportamento, a confirmação da tese proposta no último post sobre o uso do cambio como instrumento par excellence de controle dos preços. Fosse outra a diretoria do Bacen, seria possível assumir ser este o caso, mas com politicização da política monetária há uma dificuldade crescente em compreender a lógica econômica do agir do guardião da moeda.

Do velho continente, felizmente, ultimamente, somente boas noticias. A última: o retorno de quase 100bi de euros de fundos privados para periferia da zona do euro.É mais um dado que confirma a nossa impressão que o pior já passou. A situação esta bem melhor, mas continua presente o risco que isto seja usado pelos políticos para empurrar com a barriga a implementação das reformas necessarias para resolver os conhecidos problemas dos países do sul da Europa.

Bacen jogou a toalha?

O Bacen descobriu o ovo de colombo: a política monetária é um instrumento de controle da demanda e como o problema da economia brasileira é do lado oferta, a política de juros baixos nada poderá fazer pra ajudar a turbinar o crescimento econômico. Em bom português: não contem com novo corte na Selic. Ela deverá manter-se em 7,25% no corrente ano e em boa parte do próximo . Dado que a autonomia operacional do Bacen é bem limitada na atual administração, qualquer declaração dele deve ser vista com certa cautela e condicionada as demandas da arena política. Ao comprar a tese que o problema é exclusivamente de oferta, ele massageia o ego dos desenvolvimentistas, mas tenho duvidas se será suficiente para convence-los que a politica de corte de juros já deu o que tinha que dar. Fixação é um problema de difícil solução e sabemos que juros reais negativos é o grande objeto de desejo dos desenvolvimentistas.

Alguns otimistas acreditam que o Bacen estaria disposto a aumentar a Selic para minimizar o risco de recrudescimento da inflação. Não parece ser o caso. A atual administração acredita que crescimento com inflação, sobre controle, mas próxima do limite superior da meta é a melhor opção de política econômica. Neste cenario, o cambio deverá tornar-se o instrumento par excellence do controle de preços. É uma escolha que não deverá agradar muito os empresários, mas nada que não posso ser resolvido com algumas desonerações e outras medidas do saco de bondades do governo.

Setor externo...

Os dados do setor externo de 2012 deixaram algum analistas espantados: como explicar a boa performance do investimento direto(ID) se o investimento domestico mostrou-se anêmico? É o tipo de comparação que não tem muito sentido, já que os determinantes não são os mesmos. O bom resultado do ID sinaliza confiança na política econômica da atual administração, apesar do pibinho o mercado domestico tem um grande potencial e é exatamente por isto que o país não deixa de atrair ID. A renda cresceu 6% em 2012 e tudo indica que o cenário em 2013 não será muito diferente. Em outras palavras, a chamada nova classe média - os antigos pobres como preferem os criticos da política social do governo - deverá continuar crescendo, incorporando maiores contingentes ao mercado domestico. Neste cenário faz todo sentido continuar investimento no Brasil para aproveitar as oportunidades presentes e, principalmente, pensando na excelente colheita que espera os que estão investimento hoje. Decisão estrategicamente correta para quem tem recursos a disposição e esta habituado a fazer negócios em ambientes em que a intervenção estatal, direta ou indireta, na economia se faz presente com mais força que no Brasil e com uma imprevisibilidade e falta de regras claras que estão longe, muito do longe do que existe por aqui.

Um outro dado que deixou alguns infelizes foi o novo recorde de despesas de brasileiros no exterior. Os brasileiros estão viajando demais, resmungam os conhecidos lideres da direita nacional. O que eles gostariam de confessar, mas, polidamente, declinam de faze-lo é expressar o horror com a presença de brasileiros - antigos pobres - no exterior, em países em que eles conheciam apenas pela tv e que agora tem a oportunidade de visitar in loco. Quem diria, eles descobriram a Europa. É um resultado que deveria ser comemorado: com o aumento da renda um numero maior de brasileiros tem a oportunidade de viajar e conhecer um mundo em que transporte público de qualidade é a norma, assim como respeito a cidadania.

A nossa direita tem um vicio de origem: tem vergonha de ser brasileira e por isto fica infeliz ao encontrar brasileiros passeando pelo velho continente. Era tão melhor quando o roteiro era a velha Florida, que, como todos sabemos, é um lugar a ser evitado e no máximo pode ser usado como ponto de partida para lugares mais civilizados. Ah! estes ex-pobres, o que fazer com eles?

Pérfida Albion

Nenhuma novidade no esperado discurso do Cameron, Primeiro Ministro da perfida Albion: referendum prometido para 2017, caso seja re-eleito. Prometeu lutar para convencer o eleitorado a votar pela permanência na União Europeia, depois de conseguir, obviamente, negociar um tratato com condições mais vantajosas para o seu país. As chances disto acontecer são pequenas e como a saida é uma pessima opção, tudo leva a crer que tudo não passa de uma grande jogada para acalmar a ala europeia do seu partido e garimpar alguns eleitores de outros partidos na próxima eleição. A reação alemã e francesa foram duras, já a holandesa, como esperado, foi, diplomaticamete, calorosa. Laurent Fabius foi bastante feliz ao comentar que ""if you join a football club, you can't say you want to play rugby". O sonho inglês, ou melhor dizendo o delirio britanico, é transformar a União Europeia em uma versão melhorada da Area de Livre Comercio Europeia. Este tipo de proposta, no momento em que se discute a consolidação da união europeia na área fiscal, é de uma falta de realismo político inacreditável...

Se o discurso do Camerom é um deja vu inofensivo, o mesmo não se pode dizer do que vem ocorrendo no Japão. Devido às pressões do recem eleito Primeiro Ministro, o Banco Central adotou a mesma política do FED e do BCE: compra ilimitada de divida pública japonesa. O objetivo oficial é resolver o problema da deflação que castiga, há varios anos, a economia japonesa - dai a meta de inflação de 2%-, mas tudo indica que o objetivo real é depreciar a moeda japonesa e deste modo favorecer as suas exportações.É uma jogada perigosa que poderá transformar em realidade a famosa guerra cambial denunciada, prematuramente, pelo Mantega. A Coreia já sentiu o impacto causado pelo política do FED e não deve estar nem um pouco feliz com a decisão japonesa e deverá levantar a lebre na próxima reunião do G20. Não será a única. O encontro promete grandes emoções nos bastidores e trabalho arduo na redação do comunicado final.

Summers e o défict público no Imperio

Lawrence Summers, o eterno pragmatico...

In the two and a half months between the election and this week’s inauguration of President Barack Obama, America’s public policy debate has been focused on prospective budget deficits and what can be done to reduce them.
The concerns are partly economic – there is a recognition that debts cannot be allowed to grow indefinitely faster than incomes and the capacity to repay them. Then there is a moral dimension in terms of not unduly burdening our children. There is also the global and security dimension, with the concern that the excessive build-up of debt would leave the US vulnerable to foreign creditors and without the flexibility to respond to international emergencies.
Economic forecasts are, of course, uncertain. Yet there is a great likelihood that, in the next 15 years, debts will rise relative to incomes in an unsustainable way if no action is taken beyond the 2011 budget deal and the end-of-year agreement to prevent the nation tumbling over the “fiscal cliff”. So even without the risk of self-inflicted catastrophes – failure to meet debt obligations or government shutdown – it is entirely appropriate to focus on reducing prospective deficits
Those who argue against a further concentration on prospective deficits on the grounds that – contingent on a forecast that assumes no recessions – the debt to gross domestic product ratio may stabilise for a decade counsel irresponsibly. Given all uncertainties and current debt levels, we should be planning to reduce debt ratios if the next decade goes well economically.
Reducing prospective deficits should be a priority – but not an obsession that takes over economic policy. This would risk the enactment of measures such as pseudo-temporary tax cuts that produce cosmetic improvements in deficits at the cost of extra uncertainty and long-run fiscal burdens. It could preclude high-return investment in areas such as infrastructure, preventive medicine and tax enforcement that would, in the very long term, improve our fiscal position.
Economists have long been familiar with the concept “repressed inflation”. When concern with measured inflation takes over economic policy, and drives the introduction of price controls or subsidies to hold down prices, the results are perverse. Measured prices may not rise, so the appearance of inflation is avoided. But shortages, black markets and enlarged budget deficits appear. The repression is unsustainable and, when it is relaxed, measured inflation explodes as in the case of the Nixon price controls during the early 1970s.
Like repressing inflation, repressing budget deficits can be a serious mistake. Yet – just as corporate managements judged only on a single year’s earnings take perverse and ultimately harmful steps – government officials in the grip of a budget obsession repress rather than resolve deficit problems.
When arbitrary cuts are imposed, agencies respond by deferring maintenance, leading to greater liabilities later. Or compensation is provided in the form of promised retirement benefits that are less than fully accounted for, with the ultimate burden on taxpayers increased. Or measures such as the recent Roth Individual Retirement Arrangement legislation are enacted, encouraging taxpayers to accelerate their tax payment while reducing present value.
As important as avoiding the repression of the budget deficit is ensuring that focusing on it does not come at the expense of other, equally real deficits. Interest rates in the US and much of the industrialised world are now remarkably low. Indeed, in real terms the government’s cost of borrowing has been negative for as long as 20 years. No one who travels from the US can doubt that we have an enormous infrastructure deficit. Surely, even leaving aside any possible stimulus benefits, current economic conditions make this the ideal time to renew the nation’s bridges and roads. Such investments, borrowed at near-zero real rates of interest, need not increase debt ratios if their contribution to growth raises tax collections.
Infrastructure deficits are only the most salient of the deficits facing the US. Nearly six years after the onset of financial crisis, we are living with substantial jobs and growth deficits. Consider this: an increase of just 0.15 per cent in the growth rate maintained over the next 10 years would reduce the debt to GDP ratio in 2023 by about 2.5 percentage points. That is an amount equal to the much-debated end-of-year tax compromise. Increasing growth also creates jobs and raises incomes.
By all means, let us address the budget deficit. But let us not obsess over it in counterproductive ways – nor lose sight of the jobs and growth deficits that will ultimately have the greatest impact on the way this generation of Americans lives and what they bequeath to the next.

Fonte: FT

Segunda-feira blues

Segunda-feira, pior dia da semana, já dizia o mestre Garfield... hoje, 21, inicio do segundo mandato do Obama que segundo O FT - que ainda não li - no discurso procurou agradar a esquerda americana. Estou enrolado, tentando escrever um artigo de 2.000 palavras, uma tortura... Sim caros, ler é sempre um prazer, escrever uma tortura..., como mantenho um blog provavelmente sou masoquista. Não acredito ser o caso...mas li em algum lugar - não sei onde - que alguns dos meus escritores favoritos sofrem de depressão cronica. Obrigação de escrever, pensei. Ou a causa seria a impossbilidade de não escrever? Este é o outro lado da moeda: não escrever, ficar remoendo pensamentos também é penoso. Difícil avaliar o que é pior: escrever ou não escrever. Por enquanto, não escrever, venceu. Felizmente a depressão não é um problema, pelo menos não ainda. Dado o historico familiar paterno é um milagre que ela ainda não tenha feito uma visita. Espero que nunca apareça.
Sentado estava, sentado estou. O tema é outro e talvez por isto tenha conseguido escrever um pouco. Desabafo? Sei lá. Ando meio de saco cheio. Desnecessário dizer com o que. Ou seria quem?

Rajoy no FT

Importante entrevista do Rajoy ao FT. Eterno otimista, ainda continua com a sua visão um tanto rosea da situação espanhola. Ela esta bem melhor, sem duvida, porém, ainda continua na marca do penalti.



In his first year in office, Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s prime minister, has at times resembled a latter-day Saint Sebastian. Assailed on all sides – by a meltdown in the banking sector, soaring unemployment and a crisis in the public finances – he has been forced to break one election promise after another. He has slashed spending and raised taxes, to the fury of Spanish voters. The low point came last June when he had to go cap-in-hand to the EU to negotiate a €100bn bailout for Spain’s tottering banks.
The economic and political turmoil has left Mr Rajoy bloodied but resolute. In a two-hour interview at the Palacio de la Moncloa, his official residence on the outskirts of Madrid, the Spanish prime minister is at pains to explain why he is determined to stay the course, and why he believes his strategy is beginning to bear fruit.
“It is the old cliché that Rajoy never takes decisions,” he says, “They say about the Gallegos [Galicians] that they like to wait and see – and they say the same thing about me. But in the year since I took over the government I reduced the public deficit in a situation where we were in recession. I pushed through structural reforms and a reform of the banking sector. I would like to know: How many non-Gallegos would have taken those decisions?”
Spaniards often describe their prime minister as a typical Galician – reserved, reluctant to give a clear answer, ever keen to keep his options open. Popular lore has it that when you meet a Galician on a staircase, you never know whether he is going up or down.
Mr Rajoy retorts that he is “proud and happy” to be from Galicia, a northwestern stronghold of his conservative Popular party. The prime minister’s attachment to his home region is evident from the pile of newspapers on his desk: ABC, the conservative daily, lies on top, followed by La Voz de Galicia, the main regional paper; El Mundo and El País, the biggest Spanish dailies, form the bottom of the pile.
With his air of small-town rectitude, Mr Rajoy offers a sharp contrast to more flamboyant predecessors, the outspoken José María Aznar or Felipe González, the charismatic socialist. Where his critics detect indecision and procrastination, Mr Rajoy sees calm and prudence. He bides his time. This is, after all, a man who lost two elections before he led the PP to a crushing victory in December 2011.
Yet, for all his caution, Mr Rajoy is strikingly assertive as he makes his case that the economic tide in Spain has finally started to turn. He points to rising exports and falling bond yields, and boasts that his labour market reform of last year has helped Spanish companies to regain competitiveness: “I think that the second half of 2013 is when we will start to see a recovery, and it will come through very clearly in 2014.”
Not everyone shares his optimism. Critics argue that the incipient recovery is being driven more by the prospect of intervention by the European Central Bank than the reformist spirit of the Rajoy government.
Spain’s prime minister firmly rejects that assertion, but is fulsome in his praise of Mario Draghi, the ECB president, whose promise last July to do “whatever it takes” to defend the single currency was seen as a turning point in the eurozone crisis. Now, says Mr Rajoy, any doubts about the future of the euro are “history”.
Mr Draghi threw Spain and other debtor countries another lifeline in September, when he announced a new programme that allows the ECB to buy government bonds in the secondary market. The catch is that Mr Draghi can only activate the programme (known as outright monetary transactions), once a government has formally requested a bailout or credit line from eurozone finance ministers. Until now, Mr Rajoy has not made that request, betting perhaps that the mere option of triggering ECB intervention is enough to calm markets.
Economists say this reluctance has made it more costly for Spain’s Treasury and Spanish companies to borrow money, delaying the recovery. There is also fear that the eurozone crisis will flare up again – for example, as a result of a potentially messy Italian election next month. (Mr Rajoy is following the run-off closely, as he refers to a recent poll in Lombardy.) Uncertainty in Italy could force Spain to seek an ECB programme amid fresh market turmoil, rather than locking in lower interest rates during the current, more tranquil period.
The failure to request intervention is often held up as Exhibit A in the case against Mr Rajoy, though it is likely that the prime minister was swayed as much by German resistance to a new programme as by his own doubts. He firmly rejects any suggestion that he was moved by a sense of Spanish pride.
“People might say that I wasn’t right by not entering the OMT. I am not really bothered by that ... We took a decision that was right for Spain.”
The shift in market sentiment suggests he is right, for now. Last week, for example, the Spanish Treasury raised more than €5.8bn in its first debt auction of the year. The issue was oversubscribed, and yields were comfortably below the levels seen in recent auctions. The sale was hailed as a powerful signal that investor confidence is finally starting to return.
There are other positive signs: Spanish exports are on the rise, defying the economic slowdown in many of the country’s key trading partners. The current account has moved into surplus, and labour costs have been flattened – a result of fierce job cuts and stagnant wages.
In fact, Spain was the only large economy in the EU in which there was a fall in unit labour costs between 2009 and last year, a trend that has not gone unnoticed in boardrooms across the continent. Carmakers such as Peugeot, Ford and Renault have all announced recently that they are either expanding or maintaining production in Spain in spite of closures elsewhere in Europe.
Towards the end of last year, Spain also made significant progress in sweeping up the mess left behind by the banking crisis. The worst-affected banks have been recapitalised and have moved their toxic assets into a state-run “bad bank”. Doubts linger about the quality of the assets and loans that remain on the books of Spain’s lenders, but Mr Rajoy is adamant that there will be no more nasty surprises: “The banking system has done a complete striptease,” he says, in an unusually colourful reference to the bank stress tests conducted last year.
These bright spots, however, appear against the backdrop of a dismal – and worsening – economy and labour market.
Most international forecasters expect Spain’s gross domestic product to shrink by about 1.4 per cent this year, after a drop in output of 1.5 per cent in 2012. Spain’s shockingly high unemployment rate, meanwhile, is expected to remain above 25 per cent this year, and will continue to cast a deep shadow over the lives of millions of Spaniards and their families.
Mr Rajoy acknowledges that unemployment remains Spain’s “most important problem”, but insists that the labour market reform he pushed through last year will help. The legislation makes it easier for companies to depart from region-wide collective wage agreements, allowing more flexible deals at factory level. It also makes it easier and cheaper to fire workers on fixed contracts, a change long demanded by Spanish employers.
. . .
Economists say that the jury is still out on Mr Rajoy’s overhaul of the job market, and they highlight the lack of mobility of Spanish labour. But Mr Rajoy is sanguine. “Recent job losses have taken place in the real estate sector, in the financial sector and in the public sector,” he says. “But in other sectors of the economy jobs have not been lost. So the labour reform has started to bear fruit.”
The employment legislation was passed just three months after Mr Rajoy entered office. In other crucial areas, however, notably the banking sector, his government was slow out of the blocks. It was also too trusting of assurances given by institutions such as the Bank of Spain. Mr Rajoy says it is “pointless” (a favourite word) to look back at past mistakes – but he cannot resist a dig at his Socialist predecessors. “I found out only a few days after I took office that the deficit could be around 8 per cent,” he exclaims.
Spain’s continuing economic crisis will dominate the rest of Mr Rajoy’s tenure. But he faces at least one other daunting challenge: Catalonia.
In the past months there has been a surge in separatist sentiment in Spain’s most important economic region, heightening fears that the government in Barcelona and Mr Rajoy are destined for a cataclysmic constitutional battle.
Artur Mas, the Catalan leader, has promised to hold a referendum next year in which Catalans would vote on whether to form an independent state. Mr Rajoy and his government insist that such a plebiscite is not allowed under the Spanish constitution – and warn that they will not tolerate any move towards Catalan secession.
“One thing you cannot ask a prime minister to do is to give up on his own country,” Mr Rajoy says, suggesting that the very idea of Spain without Catalonia is unconscionable. Though he steers clear of the inflammatory rhetoric towards Barcelona used by some of his ministers, Mr Rajoy leaves no doubt that he regards national unity as non-negotiable.
“The unity of Spain goes back more than five centuries. This is the oldest country in Europe,” he says, insisting that Spaniards, including Catalans, are “united by many things”. Many Catalans offer a radically different interpretation of Spanish history, and insist that Catalonia has always been a nation – and a people – apart.
But Mr Rajoy argues that the Catalan push for independence runs counter not only to history, but also to the present. “The world is going in a totally different direction,” he asserts, pointing to the increasingly dense web of supranational alliances and federations that spans the globe. “We are working towards greater integration and not the opposite,” he says.
. . .
The prime minister says he is ready to discuss a new financial compact between Madrid and the regions, including Catalonia, suggesting that such a deal may be sufficient to calm the current tensions. Like many decision makers in the capital, he is convinced that the Catalan leadership, for all its rhetoric, will ultimately step back from all-out conflict with Madrid.
For much of his first year in office, Spain’s prime minister has been so busy stamping out political and economic fires that he has been preoccupied by crisis management. Asked what he hopes to achieve as his political legacy, Mr Rajoy responds that he would be happy to “lay the foundations for a strong economy” and “help European integration”.
These are challenging but modest goals for a country that, only a few years ago, was poised to join the Group of Eight leading world nations; that served as a crucial US ally during the Iraq war; and that – under Mr Rajoy’s predecessor – launched a high-flying diplomatic initiative known as the Alliance of Civilisations.
Where, then, is the poetry in his political ambition?
“Poetry?” asks Mr Rajoy, momentarily taken aback. “My thing is prose.”
Biography: Cautious path from provinces to power
Mariano Rajoy could have easily led a quiet life. Born, raised and educated in the coastal region of Galicia, he became the youngest Spaniard to pass the examination for property notaries after his law degree. The country’s registradores make up a much-envied caste that is well paid, protected from competition and redolent of a respected, comfortable existence in the provinces.
Instead, Mr Rajoy embarked on a career in politics that took him from his home region to Madrid, and finally on to the European stage. He served as minister for public administration, education and interior affairs – before taking over the leadership of the centre-right Popular party in 2004. What followed was seven years as opposition leader and two consecutive election defeats; he finally swept to victory in November 2011.
The 57-year-old father of two is widely seen as a cautious figure, lacking in charisma. His supporters, however, say he is hard-working, solid and persistent. Mr Rajoy is said to keep his distance from business leaders, and has shown little interest in the trappings of wealth and power.
Like many of his countrymen, Mr Rajoy is an avid sports fan, taking great pride in the recent successes of Spanish teams and athletes. Football is a particular passion, and he closely follows the fortunes of Real Madrid, his club side, and the national team. In fact, Mr Rajoy raised eyebrows when – fresh from negotiating a €100bn bailout package for Spain’s banks – he decided to travel to Poland to watch Spain’s opening match at the European Championships last year. Critics accused him of unstatesmanlike behaviour, saying he should have addressed the crisis-scarred nation instead.

Fonte: FT

Rajoy no FT

Importante entrevista do Rajoy ao FT. Eterno otimista, desta vez ele como apresentar exemplos que fundamentam a sua visão um tanto rosea da situação espanhola. Esta bem melhor, sem duvida, porém, ainda continua na marca do penalti.



In his first year in office, Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s prime minister, has at times resembled a latter-day Saint Sebastian. Assailed on all sides – by a meltdown in the banking sector, soaring unemployment and a crisis in the public finances – he has been forced to break one election promise after another. He has slashed spending and raised taxes, to the fury of Spanish voters. The low point came last June when he had to go cap-in-hand to the EU to negotiate a €100bn bailout for Spain’s tottering banks.
The economic and political turmoil has left Mr Rajoy bloodied but resolute. In a two-hour interview at the Palacio de la Moncloa, his official residence on the outskirts of Madrid, the Spanish prime minister is at pains to explain why he is determined to stay the course, and why he believes his strategy is beginning to bear fruit.
“It is the old cliché that Rajoy never takes decisions,” he says, “They say about the Gallegos [Galicians] that they like to wait and see – and they say the same thing about me. But in the year since I took over the government I reduced the public deficit in a situation where we were in recession. I pushed through structural reforms and a reform of the banking sector. I would like to know: How many non-Gallegos would have taken those decisions?”
Spaniards often describe their prime minister as a typical Galician – reserved, reluctant to give a clear answer, ever keen to keep his options open. Popular lore has it that when you meet a Galician on a staircase, you never know whether he is going up or down.
Mr Rajoy retorts that he is “proud and happy” to be from Galicia, a northwestern stronghold of his conservative Popular party. The prime minister’s attachment to his home region is evident from the pile of newspapers on his desk: ABC, the conservative daily, lies on top, followed by La Voz de Galicia, the main regional paper; El Mundo and El País, the biggest Spanish dailies, form the bottom of the pile.
With his air of small-town rectitude, Mr Rajoy offers a sharp contrast to more flamboyant predecessors, the outspoken José María Aznar or Felipe González, the charismatic socialist. Where his critics detect indecision and procrastination, Mr Rajoy sees calm and prudence. He bides his time. This is, after all, a man who lost two elections before he led the PP to a crushing victory in December 2011.
Yet, for all his caution, Mr Rajoy is strikingly assertive as he makes his case that the economic tide in Spain has finally started to turn. He points to rising exports and falling bond yields, and boasts that his labour market reform of last year has helped Spanish companies to regain competitiveness: “I think that the second half of 2013 is when we will start to see a recovery, and it will come through very clearly in 2014.”
Not everyone shares his optimism. Critics argue that the incipient recovery is being driven more by the prospect of intervention by the European Central Bank than the reformist spirit of the Rajoy government.
Spain’s prime minister firmly rejects that assertion, but is fulsome in his praise of Mario Draghi, the ECB president, whose promise last July to do “whatever it takes” to defend the single currency was seen as a turning point in the eurozone crisis. Now, says Mr Rajoy, any doubts about the future of the euro are “history”.
Mr Draghi threw Spain and other debtor countries another lifeline in September, when he announced a new programme that allows the ECB to buy government bonds in the secondary market. The catch is that Mr Draghi can only activate the programme (known as outright monetary transactions), once a government has formally requested a bailout or credit line from eurozone finance ministers. Until now, Mr Rajoy has not made that request, betting perhaps that the mere option of triggering ECB intervention is enough to calm markets.
Economists say this reluctance has made it more costly for Spain’s Treasury and Spanish companies to borrow money, delaying the recovery. There is also fear that the eurozone crisis will flare up again – for example, as a result of a potentially messy Italian election next month. (Mr Rajoy is following the run-off closely, as he refers to a recent poll in Lombardy.) Uncertainty in Italy could force Spain to seek an ECB programme amid fresh market turmoil, rather than locking in lower interest rates during the current, more tranquil period.
The failure to request intervention is often held up as Exhibit A in the case against Mr Rajoy, though it is likely that the prime minister was swayed as much by German resistance to a new programme as by his own doubts. He firmly rejects any suggestion that he was moved by a sense of Spanish pride.
“People might say that I wasn’t right by not entering the OMT. I am not really bothered by that ... We took a decision that was right for Spain.”
The shift in market sentiment suggests he is right, for now. Last week, for example, the Spanish Treasury raised more than €5.8bn in its first debt auction of the year. The issue was oversubscribed, and yields were comfortably below the levels seen in recent auctions. The sale was hailed as a powerful signal that investor confidence is finally starting to return.
There are other positive signs: Spanish exports are on the rise, defying the economic slowdown in many of the country’s key trading partners. The current account has moved into surplus, and labour costs have been flattened – a result of fierce job cuts and stagnant wages.
In fact, Spain was the only large economy in the EU in which there was a fall in unit labour costs between 2009 and last year, a trend that has not gone unnoticed in boardrooms across the continent. Carmakers such as Peugeot, Ford and Renault have all announced recently that they are either expanding or maintaining production in Spain in spite of closures elsewhere in Europe.
Towards the end of last year, Spain also made significant progress in sweeping up the mess left behind by the banking crisis. The worst-affected banks have been recapitalised and have moved their toxic assets into a state-run “bad bank”. Doubts linger about the quality of the assets and loans that remain on the books of Spain’s lenders, but Mr Rajoy is adamant that there will be no more nasty surprises: “The banking system has done a complete striptease,” he says, in an unusually colourful reference to the bank stress tests conducted last year.
These bright spots, however, appear against the backdrop of a dismal – and worsening – economy and labour market.
Most international forecasters expect Spain’s gross domestic product to shrink by about 1.4 per cent this year, after a drop in output of 1.5 per cent in 2012. Spain’s shockingly high unemployment rate, meanwhile, is expected to remain above 25 per cent this year, and will continue to cast a deep shadow over the lives of millions of Spaniards and their families.
Mr Rajoy acknowledges that unemployment remains Spain’s “most important problem”, but insists that the labour market reform he pushed through last year will help. The legislation makes it easier for companies to depart from region-wide collective wage agreements, allowing more flexible deals at factory level. It also makes it easier and cheaper to fire workers on fixed contracts, a change long demanded by Spanish employers.
. . .
Economists say that the jury is still out on Mr Rajoy’s overhaul of the job market, and they highlight the lack of mobility of Spanish labour. But Mr Rajoy is sanguine. “Recent job losses have taken place in the real estate sector, in the financial sector and in the public sector,” he says. “But in other sectors of the economy jobs have not been lost. So the labour reform has started to bear fruit.”
The employment legislation was passed just three months after Mr Rajoy entered office. In other crucial areas, however, notably the banking sector, his government was slow out of the blocks. It was also too trusting of assurances given by institutions such as the Bank of Spain. Mr Rajoy says it is “pointless” (a favourite word) to look back at past mistakes – but he cannot resist a dig at his Socialist predecessors. “I found out only a few days after I took office that the deficit could be around 8 per cent,” he exclaims.
Spain’s continuing economic crisis will dominate the rest of Mr Rajoy’s tenure. But he faces at least one other daunting challenge: Catalonia.
In the past months there has been a surge in separatist sentiment in Spain’s most important economic region, heightening fears that the government in Barcelona and Mr Rajoy are destined for a cataclysmic constitutional battle.
Artur Mas, the Catalan leader, has promised to hold a referendum next year in which Catalans would vote on whether to form an independent state. Mr Rajoy and his government insist that such a plebiscite is not allowed under the Spanish constitution – and warn that they will not tolerate any move towards Catalan secession.
“One thing you cannot ask a prime minister to do is to give up on his own country,” Mr Rajoy says, suggesting that the very idea of Spain without Catalonia is unconscionable. Though he steers clear of the inflammatory rhetoric towards Barcelona used by some of his ministers, Mr Rajoy leaves no doubt that he regards national unity as non-negotiable.
“The unity of Spain goes back more than five centuries. This is the oldest country in Europe,” he says, insisting that Spaniards, including Catalans, are “united by many things”. Many Catalans offer a radically different interpretation of Spanish history, and insist that Catalonia has always been a nation – and a people – apart.
But Mr Rajoy argues that the Catalan push for independence runs counter not only to history, but also to the present. “The world is going in a totally different direction,” he asserts, pointing to the increasingly dense web of supranational alliances and federations that spans the globe. “We are working towards greater integration and not the opposite,” he says.
. . .
The prime minister says he is ready to discuss a new financial compact between Madrid and the regions, including Catalonia, suggesting that such a deal may be sufficient to calm the current tensions. Like many decision makers in the capital, he is convinced that the Catalan leadership, for all its rhetoric, will ultimately step back from all-out conflict with Madrid.
For much of his first year in office, Spain’s prime minister has been so busy stamping out political and economic fires that he has been preoccupied by crisis management. Asked what he hopes to achieve as his political legacy, Mr Rajoy responds that he would be happy to “lay the foundations for a strong economy” and “help European integration”.
These are challenging but modest goals for a country that, only a few years ago, was poised to join the Group of Eight leading world nations; that served as a crucial US ally during the Iraq war; and that – under Mr Rajoy’s predecessor – launched a high-flying diplomatic initiative known as the Alliance of Civilisations.
Where, then, is the poetry in his political ambition?
“Poetry?” asks Mr Rajoy, momentarily taken aback. “My thing is prose.”
Biography: Cautious path from provinces to power
Mariano Rajoy could have easily led a quiet life. Born, raised and educated in the coastal region of Galicia, he became the youngest Spaniard to pass the examination for property notaries after his law degree. The country’s registradores make up a much-envied caste that is well paid, protected from competition and redolent of a respected, comfortable existence in the provinces.
Instead, Mr Rajoy embarked on a career in politics that took him from his home region to Madrid, and finally on to the European stage. He served as minister for public administration, education and interior affairs – before taking over the leadership of the centre-right Popular party in 2004. What followed was seven years as opposition leader and two consecutive election defeats; he finally swept to victory in November 2011.
The 57-year-old father of two is widely seen as a cautious figure, lacking in charisma. His supporters, however, say he is hard-working, solid and persistent. Mr Rajoy is said to keep his distance from business leaders, and has shown little interest in the trappings of wealth and power.
Like many of his countrymen, Mr Rajoy is an avid sports fan, taking great pride in the recent successes of Spanish teams and athletes. Football is a particular passion, and he closely follows the fortunes of Real Madrid, his club side, and the national team. In fact, Mr Rajoy raised eyebrows when – fresh from negotiating a €100bn bailout package for Spain’s banks – he decided to travel to Poland to watch Spain’s opening match at the European Championships last year. Critics accused him of unstatesmanlike behaviour, saying he should have addressed the crisis-scarred nation instead.

Fonte: FT

Rajoy no FT

Importante entrevista do Rajoy ao FT. Eterno otimista, desta vez ele como apresentar exemplos que fundamentam a sua visão um tanto rosea da situação espanhola. Esta bem melhor, sem duvida, porém, ainda continua na marca do penalti.



In his first year in office, Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s prime minister, has at times resembled a latter-day Saint Sebastian. Assailed on all sides – by a meltdown in the banking sector, soaring unemployment and a crisis in the public finances – he has been forced to break one election promise after another. He has slashed spending and raised taxes, to the fury of Spanish voters. The low point came last June when he had to go cap-in-hand to the EU to negotiate a €100bn bailout for Spain’s tottering banks.
The economic and political turmoil has left Mr Rajoy bloodied but resolute. In a two-hour interview at the Palacio de la Moncloa, his official residence on the outskirts of Madrid, the Spanish prime minister is at pains to explain why he is determined to stay the course, and why he believes his strategy is beginning to bear fruit.
“It is the old cliché that Rajoy never takes decisions,” he says, “They say about the Gallegos [Galicians] that they like to wait and see – and they say the same thing about me. But in the year since I took over the government I reduced the public deficit in a situation where we were in recession. I pushed through structural reforms and a reform of the banking sector. I would like to know: How many non-Gallegos would have taken those decisions?”
Spaniards often describe their prime minister as a typical Galician – reserved, reluctant to give a clear answer, ever keen to keep his options open. Popular lore has it that when you meet a Galician on a staircase, you never know whether he is going up or down.
Mr Rajoy retorts that he is “proud and happy” to be from Galicia, a northwestern stronghold of his conservative Popular party. The prime minister’s attachment to his home region is evident from the pile of newspapers on his desk: ABC, the conservative daily, lies on top, followed by La Voz de Galicia, the main regional paper; El Mundo and El País, the biggest Spanish dailies, form the bottom of the pile.
With his air of small-town rectitude, Mr Rajoy offers a sharp contrast to more flamboyant predecessors, the outspoken José María Aznar or Felipe González, the charismatic socialist. Where his critics detect indecision and procrastination, Mr Rajoy sees calm and prudence. He bides his time. This is, after all, a man who lost two elections before he led the PP to a crushing victory in December 2011.
Yet, for all his caution, Mr Rajoy is strikingly assertive as he makes his case that the economic tide in Spain has finally started to turn. He points to rising exports and falling bond yields, and boasts that his labour market reform of last year has helped Spanish companies to regain competitiveness: “I think that the second half of 2013 is when we will start to see a recovery, and it will come through very clearly in 2014.”
Not everyone shares his optimism. Critics argue that the incipient recovery is being driven more by the prospect of intervention by the European Central Bank than the reformist spirit of the Rajoy government.
Spain’s prime minister firmly rejects that assertion, but is fulsome in his praise of Mario Draghi, the ECB president, whose promise last July to do “whatever it takes” to defend the single currency was seen as a turning point in the eurozone crisis. Now, says Mr Rajoy, any doubts about the future of the euro are “history”.
Mr Draghi threw Spain and other debtor countries another lifeline in September, when he announced a new programme that allows the ECB to buy government bonds in the secondary market. The catch is that Mr Draghi can only activate the programme (known as outright monetary transactions), once a government has formally requested a bailout or credit line from eurozone finance ministers. Until now, Mr Rajoy has not made that request, betting perhaps that the mere option of triggering ECB intervention is enough to calm markets.
Economists say this reluctance has made it more costly for Spain’s Treasury and Spanish companies to borrow money, delaying the recovery. There is also fear that the eurozone crisis will flare up again – for example, as a result of a potentially messy Italian election next month. (Mr Rajoy is following the run-off closely, as he refers to a recent poll in Lombardy.) Uncertainty in Italy could force Spain to seek an ECB programme amid fresh market turmoil, rather than locking in lower interest rates during the current, more tranquil period.
The failure to request intervention is often held up as Exhibit A in the case against Mr Rajoy, though it is likely that the prime minister was swayed as much by German resistance to a new programme as by his own doubts. He firmly rejects any suggestion that he was moved by a sense of Spanish pride.
“People might say that I wasn’t right by not entering the OMT. I am not really bothered by that ... We took a decision that was right for Spain.”
The shift in market sentiment suggests he is right, for now. Last week, for example, the Spanish Treasury raised more than €5.8bn in its first debt auction of the year. The issue was oversubscribed, and yields were comfortably below the levels seen in recent auctions. The sale was hailed as a powerful signal that investor confidence is finally starting to return.
There are other positive signs: Spanish exports are on the rise, defying the economic slowdown in many of the country’s key trading partners. The current account has moved into surplus, and labour costs have been flattened – a result of fierce job cuts and stagnant wages.
In fact, Spain was the only large economy in the EU in which there was a fall in unit labour costs between 2009 and last year, a trend that has not gone unnoticed in boardrooms across the continent. Carmakers such as Peugeot, Ford and Renault have all announced recently that they are either expanding or maintaining production in Spain in spite of closures elsewhere in Europe.
Towards the end of last year, Spain also made significant progress in sweeping up the mess left behind by the banking crisis. The worst-affected banks have been recapitalised and have moved their toxic assets into a state-run “bad bank”. Doubts linger about the quality of the assets and loans that remain on the books of Spain’s lenders, but Mr Rajoy is adamant that there will be no more nasty surprises: “The banking system has done a complete striptease,” he says, in an unusually colourful reference to the bank stress tests conducted last year.
These bright spots, however, appear against the backdrop of a dismal – and worsening – economy and labour market.
Most international forecasters expect Spain’s gross domestic product to shrink by about 1.4 per cent this year, after a drop in output of 1.5 per cent in 2012. Spain’s shockingly high unemployment rate, meanwhile, is expected to remain above 25 per cent this year, and will continue to cast a deep shadow over the lives of millions of Spaniards and their families.
Mr Rajoy acknowledges that unemployment remains Spain’s “most important problem”, but insists that the labour market reform he pushed through last year will help. The legislation makes it easier for companies to depart from region-wide collective wage agreements, allowing more flexible deals at factory level. It also makes it easier and cheaper to fire workers on fixed contracts, a change long demanded by Spanish employers.
. . .
Economists say that the jury is still out on Mr Rajoy’s overhaul of the job market, and they highlight the lack of mobility of Spanish labour. But Mr Rajoy is sanguine. “Recent job losses have taken place in the real estate sector, in the financial sector and in the public sector,” he says. “But in other sectors of the economy jobs have not been lost. So the labour reform has started to bear fruit.”
The employment legislation was passed just three months after Mr Rajoy entered office. In other crucial areas, however, notably the banking sector, his government was slow out of the blocks. It was also too trusting of assurances given by institutions such as the Bank of Spain. Mr Rajoy says it is “pointless” (a favourite word) to look back at past mistakes – but he cannot resist a dig at his Socialist predecessors. “I found out only a few days after I took office that the deficit could be around 8 per cent,” he exclaims.
Spain’s continuing economic crisis will dominate the rest of Mr Rajoy’s tenure. But he faces at least one other daunting challenge: Catalonia.
In the past months there has been a surge in separatist sentiment in Spain’s most important economic region, heightening fears that the government in Barcelona and Mr Rajoy are destined for a cataclysmic constitutional battle.
Artur Mas, the Catalan leader, has promised to hold a referendum next year in which Catalans would vote on whether to form an independent state. Mr Rajoy and his government insist that such a plebiscite is not allowed under the Spanish constitution – and warn that they will not tolerate any move towards Catalan secession.
“One thing you cannot ask a prime minister to do is to give up on his own country,” Mr Rajoy says, suggesting that the very idea of Spain without Catalonia is unconscionable. Though he steers clear of the inflammatory rhetoric towards Barcelona used by some of his ministers, Mr Rajoy leaves no doubt that he regards national unity as non-negotiable.
“The unity of Spain goes back more than five centuries. This is the oldest country in Europe,” he says, insisting that Spaniards, including Catalans, are “united by many things”. Many Catalans offer a radically different interpretation of Spanish history, and insist that Catalonia has always been a nation – and a people – apart.
But Mr Rajoy argues that the Catalan push for independence runs counter not only to history, but also to the present. “The world is going in a totally different direction,” he asserts, pointing to the increasingly dense web of supranational alliances and federations that spans the globe. “We are working towards greater integration and not the opposite,” he says.
. . .
The prime minister says he is ready to discuss a new financial compact between Madrid and the regions, including Catalonia, suggesting that such a deal may be sufficient to calm the current tensions. Like many decision makers in the capital, he is convinced that the Catalan leadership, for all its rhetoric, will ultimately step back from all-out conflict with Madrid.
For much of his first year in office, Spain’s prime minister has been so busy stamping out political and economic fires that he has been preoccupied by crisis management. Asked what he hopes to achieve as his political legacy, Mr Rajoy responds that he would be happy to “lay the foundations for a strong economy” and “help European integration”.
These are challenging but modest goals for a country that, only a few years ago, was poised to join the Group of Eight leading world nations; that served as a crucial US ally during the Iraq war; and that – under Mr Rajoy’s predecessor – launched a high-flying diplomatic initiative known as the Alliance of Civilisations.
Where, then, is the poetry in his political ambition?
“Poetry?” asks Mr Rajoy, momentarily taken aback. “My thing is prose.”
Biography: Cautious path from provinces to power
Mariano Rajoy could have easily led a quiet life. Born, raised and educated in the coastal region of Galicia, he became the youngest Spaniard to pass the examination for property notaries after his law degree. The country’s registradores make up a much-envied caste that is well paid, protected from competition and redolent of a respected, comfortable existence in the provinces.
Instead, Mr Rajoy embarked on a career in politics that took him from his home region to Madrid, and finally on to the European stage. He served as minister for public administration, education and interior affairs – before taking over the leadership of the centre-right Popular party in 2004. What followed was seven years as opposition leader and two consecutive election defeats; he finally swept to victory in November 2011.
The 57-year-old father of two is widely seen as a cautious figure, lacking in charisma. His supporters, however, say he is hard-working, solid and persistent. Mr Rajoy is said to keep his distance from business leaders, and has shown little interest in the trappings of wealth and power.
Like many of his countrymen, Mr Rajoy is an avid sports fan, taking great pride in the recent successes of Spanish teams and athletes. Football is a particular passion, and he closely follows the fortunes of Real Madrid, his club side, and the national team. In fact, Mr Rajoy raised eyebrows when – fresh from negotiating a €100bn bailout package for Spain’s banks – he decided to travel to Poland to watch Spain’s opening match at the European Championships last year. Critics accused him of unstatesmanlike behaviour, saying he should have addressed the crisis-scarred nation instead.

Fonte: FT

O Bacen caiu na real?

"O Copom decidiu, por unanimidade, manter a taxa Selic em 7,25% a.a., sem viés.

Considerando o balanço de riscos para a inflação, que apresentou piora no curto prazo, a recuperação da atividade doméstica, menos intensa do que o esperado, e a complexidade que ainda envolve o ambiente internacional, o Comitê entende que a estabilidade das condições monetárias por um período de tempo suficientemente prolongado é a estratégia mais adequada para garantir a convergência da inflação para a meta"

Aleluia,Aleluia, o Bacen finalmente reconhece os riscos de piora da inflação no curto prazo. Já não era sem tempo, mas não espere, meu caro amigo otimista, mudança de rumo antes da materialização do risco. O foco continua sendo a retomada do crescimento econômico, mesmo que o preço seja uma inflação no limite da meta. É a retomada da velha máxima do velho desenvolvimentismo: crescimento com inflação. É verdade que o cenário é diferente- desta vez ela esta sobre controle, porém é um risco desnecessario e que em nada ajuda a melhorar a situação dos mais pobres que, como sabemos, é quem mais sofre com o aumento dos preços.

O Governo esta correto ao pedir aos prefeitos de SP e RJ, para postergarem o aumento da passagem dos onibus. Ela, no entanto, é uma medida paliativa, no melhor estilo jeitinho brasileiro que já tornou-se a marca registrada do Guido Mantega e reforça a percepção da falta de um plano de ação, de uma proposta consistente de crescimento econômico com inflação convergindo para a meta.

Balança mas não cai...

A nova direita, sem votos, esta histérica devido a contabilidade criativa de Guido e cia. Ele errou, obviamente, já que um superavit primário abaixo da meta poderia ser perfeitamente justificável, enquanto que a opção escolhida emite sinais equivocados sobre a postura fiscal do governo e, naturalmente, intensifica o processo de fritura do Ministro. Será que ele vai conseguir resistir? Acredito que sim, não devido a meritos próprios, mas pelo simples fato que manda-lo passear, agora, seria uma derrota do Governo. Digo agora, porque no momento adequado, que não deverá demorar muito, ele deverá sair de cena. É questão de tempo...
A saida do Guido não levaria a mudanças de rumo na política econômica, pois me parece que ele é determinado pela Presidente que afinal também é economista. Ela, no entanto, deveria, reconhecer que a linha adotada requer correções e que a postura fortemente intervencionista não esta gerando o resultado esperado e poderá comprometer a sua reeleição. O retorno da direita seria um desastre, principalmente para os mais pobres que tem sido os grandes beneficiados nestes 10 anos de governo de esquerda.
Não deixa de ser ironico o fato dos economistas mais histericos serem ex-Bacen na gestão Lula e Dilma. Desnecessário dizer que eram e continuam a ser militantes aguerridos do PSDB e sem a participação no governo, que eles tanto criticam, seriam ilustres desconhecidos. É herança maldita do homem de uma certa cidade do interior paulista...Alias, por onde ele anda?

Nakano e o Planejamento

"É preciso aprender a planejar" é o titulo do artigo abaixo, publicado no Valor desta terça feira, pelo Nakano. Gostei do artigo, mas confesso que não entendi o titulo, já que o argumento apresentado demonstra a ineficiência de um sistema de planejamento central. É ilusório achar que "instituições de planejamento permitem insular o governo de pressões tópicas evitando que grupos de interesses específicos tenham excessiva influência". O resultado, provável, é justamente o contrário: aumentar a influência, via captura da instituição de planejamento. Não, não estou sendo pessimista, apenas realista que, sabidamente, não é o forte do meu caro orientador de mestrado.





Aos poucos está se desfazendo o mito do "mercado eficiente" no pensamento econômico dominante e formador de opinião pública no Brasil. Por "mercado eficiente" entende-se um mecanismo que se não sofrer interferências do governo é capaz de coordenar de forma ótima a alocação de recursos e a produção e capaz de promover transações sempre em equilíbrio. Para que isso aconteça é necessário implícita ou explicitamente supor que os agentes econômicos sejam racionais, no sentido de, entre outros requisitos, possuírem o conhecimento e capacidade de prever corretamente o funcionamento do sistema como um todo, em toda a sua complexidade.

Na verdade, os pressupostos teóricos por trás do conceito de "mercado eficiente" são os mesmos do modelo soviético de planificação central. Nesse último modelo supunha-se que o planificador central (o governo) tinha todas as informações, processava-as de forma ótima e, principalmente, tinha conhecimento de todas as complexidades e o funcionamento do sistema no seu conjunto. O governo é "onisciente" ou tem um modelo teórico que é verdadeiro, portanto capaz de antecipadamente prever todas as ocorrências.

Da mesma forma, na ideia de mercado eficiente supõe-se a existência de um leiloeiro no sistema, que tem todas as informações e fixa os preços de equilíbrio, tal como o planejador central. Ou que os agentes individuais sejam racionais no sentido de serem capazes de fazer a "previsão perfeita" ou tenham expectativas racionais, todas as informações e sejam capazes de processá-las a partir de um modelo teórico perfeito e verdadeiro. Assim como o mito da planificação central eficiente desmoronou na década de 1980, o do mercado eficiente está se desfazendo com a crise financeira.

Não há dúvidas de que o mercado seja o melhor mecanismo descentralizado para alocar recursos, captar as novas ideias e transformá-las em inovações e coordenar o processo de produção. Entretanto assumir que, se for deixado funcionar livremente gera sempre um equilíbrio ótimo está longe da verdade. Onde esse mito avançou demais foi necessária a forte intervenção do governo para evitar o colapso. Muito mais longe da realidade é assumir que os agentes individuais ou o planejador central possuam o modelo perfeito e verdadeiro da realidade no seu conjunto e tenham o conhecimento prévio da situação de equilíbrio ótimo.

Assim, também onde a intervenção do Estado avançou demais é preciso retraí-la, utilizando o mercado para aumentar a eficiência do sistema econômico. Portanto, nenhum dos dois mecanismo é perfeito e eficiente, ambos apresentam enormes falhas. As instituições devem ser criadas pela sociedade exatamente para sanar essas falhas, tanto do mercado como do governo. Dessa forma, o planejamento pode ser visto como instrumento institucional para o bom funcionamento da economia de mercado. Deve informar os formadores de opinião pública sobre as perspectivas de longo prazo, fornecer o quadro de referencia tanto para as decisões do setor privado como do governo, bem como para o próprio governo conduzir suas políticas e fazer as reformas necessárias.

Para que uma economia de mercado funcione bem é necessário um quadro de referência a partir do qual se possa ter uma visão de longo prazo, fazer projeções, avaliar as opções econômicas existentes para que se possa tomar decisões econômicas com mínimo de segurança.

Um dos aspectos mais graves e profundos da atual crise da economia brasileira é exatamente o fato de não termos um planejamento no sentido definido acima. Durante o período liberalizante (governo FHC) vendeu-se um discurso de que o Estado devia intervir o menos possível porque o "mercado resolve". Mas pouco foi feito em termos de reformas, além das privatizações e da liberalização do mercado financeiro, para realmente promover o bom funcionamento dos mecanismos de mercado, especialmente estabelecer os preços macroeconômicos de equilíbrio (juros, câmbio, tributação, preço da energia etc.) e remover as falhas de governo devido à excessiva burocracia e intervenção ineficiente do governo.

Depois da fase de transição (governo Lula), a opinião pública se convenceu de que o governo passou a ser muito mais intervencionista, mas não definiu claramente suas funções, seu domínio nem a sua extensão, muito menos houve um processo político de "concertação" com o setor privado de forma a garantir confiabilidade.

O que podemos dizer é que há aparentemente uma disposição do governo ao diálogo com o setor privado. Mas, de um lado, o debate vem se dando no plano ideológico como uma conversa entre surdos, dos liberalizantes contra os estatizantes; e de outro, sem a definição de uma pauta e sem um foco claro, as decisões do governo tornam-se pontuais, desconexas e até caem no vazio em vez de construir racionalmente um quadro de referência confiável para tomada de posições

Aos liberalizantes é preciso ficar claro que em qualquer sociedade democrática e moderna as demandas políticas referentes a direitos sociais e distribuição de renda; desenvolvimento da infraestrutura física e social, incluindo energia; educação, saúde, segurança, e outros objetivos requerem maior ou menor grau de intervenção do governo.

Os estatizantes precisam entender que há falhas de governo e que no caso brasileiro os indicadores internacionais de eficiência dos serviços prestados pelo governo estão entre as piores do mundo. O governo tem que entender que um bom planejamento permite a coordenação e dá coerência e sentido às suas intervenções, além de promover a eficiência e credibilidade. Mais do que isso, instituições de planejamento permitem insular o governo de pressões tópicas evitando que grupos de interesses específicos tenham excessiva influência.

Yoshiaki Nakano,


Fonte: Valor

Modenesi e o tripé da política econômica

A semana começa com grande espaço no Valor aos desenvolvimentistas: o artigo abaixo, do Modenesi procura encontrar alguma lógica no conjunto de medidas adotadas pelo Governo, meu colega, Lacerda,da Católica de SP, em entrevista procurar fazer o mesmo. Movimento articulado? Não sei. É, sem dúvida, muito bem vindo...mas confesso que não compartilho o ótimismo dos dois.


A manutenção (ou abandono) do tripé de política econômica tem sido alvo de intenso debate. Os mais ortodoxos já velaram e rezaram missa para o sacramentado tripé. Calcados na crença de que há uma única forma (quase mágica) de se conduzir a política econômica eles selaram nosso destino: se não reconstituirmos rapidamente o tripé, vamos voltar aos velhos tempos de alta inflação, baixo crescimento, descontrole das contas públicas etc. O debate não se deve reduzir a essa polarização superficial e simplória. Não há apenas duas opções disponíveis: a correta (tripé) e a incorreta (abandono do tripé). Como já defendi neste espaço (Valor, 13/junho), o governo Dilma tem promovido uma reorientação gradual na política econômica. Trata-se de um processo que - apesar de lento e, em larga medida, limitado - representa um avanço, particularmente no tratamento da inflação, como exposto a seguir.

Primeiro, ressalte-se o bem sucedido esforço de diversificação dos instrumentos de política monetária: a redução sem precedentes da Selic não desviou a inflação drasticamente de sua média, como previram os mais alarmistas. É verdade que esse verdadeiro feito - a ser talvez o principal legado da presidente Dilma - contou com crucial ajuda externa, materializada tanto no desaquecimento global quanto em agressiva flexibilização da política monetária por parte dos principais bancos centrais, como o Fed (banco central americano), Banco da Inglaterra (BoE) e o Banco do Japão (BoJ). No entanto, a despeito da importância dos condicionantes externos da inflação, não se pode creditar o sucesso do Banco Central brasileiro apenas ao ambiente externo benigno ou deflacionário.

O uso de medidas macroprudenciais e de controle de crédito mostrou-se acertado. O resultado é que o BC - ao reconhecer, ainda que tacitamente, a limitada eficácia da Selic no combate à inflação - agora dispõe de um conjunto mais amplo de instrumentos. Nesse sentido, ele se tornou mais apto a cumprir a meta de inflação do que quando usava apenas a Selic, seguindo de forma cega o princípio de Taylor.

Segundo, verificou-se uma atuação mais ativa do Ministério da Fazenda (MF) - sobretudo mais coordenada com o BC - no combate à inflação. O MF tem contribuído de diversas formas para a flexibilização da política monetária. A mudança na regra de remuneração da poupança é exemplo notório. A presidente Dilma, diferentemente de Lula, teve a coragem de remover um dos pisos que dificultava a queda da Selic. Mais recentemente, é possível identificar outro importante avanço na estratégia de estabilização de preços: uma mudança tanto no diagnóstico quanto na estratégia de combate à inflação. Passou-se a reconhecer que as pressões conjunturais de demanda são apenas um dos componentes da inflação - e que, portanto, não cabe apenas ao BC a tarefa de cumprir a meta. Ao mesmo tempo, já se admite a relevância de pressões inflacionárias estruturais advindas do lado oferta - a serem combatidas pelo MF com instrumentos não monetários.

O ataque direto às pressões de custo é inovação sem precedentes na história brasileira contemporânea, notadamente após o Plano Real. A medida mais impactante foi a revisão das tarifas do setor elétrico - anunciada, explicitamente, como uma medida de combate à inflação. No mesmo sentido vão as demais desonerações tributárias, com destaque para a redução da contribuição patronal sobre a folha salarial visando diminuir o custo da mão de obra. Assim, ataca-se a chamada inflação de impostos que, ao onerarem excessivamente a produção, potencializa a alta dos preços.

A desindexação dos ativos financeiros - resíduo anacrônico do período de alta inflação - é outro importante passo dado pelo governo. Por um lado, a parcela da dívida pública indexada à Selic (LFT) foi reduzida expressivamente (para menos de 30%). Concomitantemente, a maturidade média da dívida pública foi elevada. Por outro, o governo estuda medidas para fomentar o mercado privado de capitais, com o objetivo de "desindexar a indústria de fundos do DI e da taxa de câmbio e alongar os prazos dos investimentos" (Valor, 4/setembro). Essas medidas potencializam a política monetária e, portanto, favorecem a queda da Selic sem ameaçar a estabilidade de preços.

Para além do debate quanto à manutenção do regime de metas de inflação (pilar hierarquicamente superior do tripé), destaca-se importante mudança no tratamento dado à inflação. Apesar dos variados alarmes, o compromisso com a estabilidade de preços não foi flexibilizado, mas sim, reforçado. Primeiro, por que o BC está melhor municiado para cumprir a meta de inflação, ao dispor de um conjunto mais amplo de instrumentos - e, portanto, não se fiar exclusivamente na Selic, cuja eficácia no combate à inflação é comprovadamente baixa. Segundo, por que o governo tornou-se aliado do BC, agindo de forma coordenada com ele, na manutenção da estabilidade. O reconhecimento de que a inflação no Brasil não depende tanto do nível de atividade econômica (ou da demanda) é um avanço. O combate às pressões estruturais de custo e a desindexação dos ativos financeiros facilitam o trabalho do Banco Central.

Em suma, constata-se um aprimoramento institucional do regime de política econômica. Trata-se de uma reorientação ainda em andamento e que, dada a complexidade dos processos decisórios subjacentes à condução da política econômica em sociedades democráticas, é lenta por natureza. O passo seguinte deveria ser uma nova rodada de desindexação, para reduzir o peso do componente inercial da inflação. Uma revisão dos preços administrados - não apenas pelo governo federal, mas, também, pelos governos subnacionais - é imprescindível. Quanto aos preços livres, a eliminação da indexação - formal e informal - em base anual, altamente difundida no país, deve ser perseguida.

André de Melo Modenesi é professor do Instituto de Economia da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (IE/UFRJ), pesquisador do CNPq e diretor da Associação Keynesiana do Brasil (AKB).

Fonte: Valor

A Espanha respira...

A velha Albion adora provocar seus eternos rivais do outro lado do canal da mancha, mas desta vez Cameron exagerou na dose: escolheu o dia em que se comemora o cinquentenario do importante Tratado de "Elysée" entre a França e a Alemanha para discursar, em Berlim, sobre a a nova proposta de relação com a Eurolandia. A data, assim como o local estão sujeitos a mudanças, mas nem por isto deixaram de provocar reações nada diplomaticas em Paris e em Berlim. A proposta a ser apresentada, assim como o referendo é uma resposta do lider conservador as pressões da ala anti-europeia do seu partido, mas dificilmente levará Albion a abandonar o barco europeu, mas poderá ajuda-la a obter maiores concessões, principalmente, de demandas bem conhecidas da City londrina. Como seguro morreu de velho, Obama já mandou recado avisando que a relação especial entre o Imperio e Albion so será mantida se ela não sair do clube europeu. Em outras palavras, ele a colocou no seu devido lugar: lembrou que seu papel é ser a ponta de lança dos interesses americanos no velho continente.
Enquanto isto, a Espanha deu inicio, com sucesso, a longa estrada para obter os 71bilhões de euro do "funding"de 2013. A demanda pela divida pública leiloada na quinta-feira ficou bem acima do esperado, superando a meta inicial: os titulos com vencimento em 2015 foram negociados por 2.467% contra 3.287% do leilão de outubro e os com vencimento em 2018 sairam por 3.988%, bem abaixo dos 4.680% alcançados em novembro. O bom resultado derrubou o yield do benchmark(titulo de 10 anos) no mercado secundário para 4.98%, o mais baixo desde Março de 2012. O mesmo aconteceu na Italia: o titulo de 10 anos caiu para 4.18%. É tudo que Rajoy e Merkel esperavam já que, como argumentamos em vários posts, se o bom resultado se repetir nos proximos leilões a Espanha poderá esperar o fim do processo eleitoral alemão em setembro, pra solicitar ajuda ao fundo de resgate. No caso da Italia a queda foi pequena, mas diante da incerteza em relação as eleições de fevereiro, não deixa de ser um ótimo resultado.

Dani Rodrik e o mercantilismo

Chamar o mercantilismo de escola é um exagero, já que é um conjunto de praxis sem um fundamentação teorica robusta como demonstrou, sem piedade, A.Smith que a ela dedicou um numero de paginas muito superior ao dedicado a outras tópicos. Ele sabia que era(é) uma pratica tentadora que agrada ao homem de negocios e ao agente político, razão pela qual, como Rodrik, observa, com razão, ela é um tema recorrente na política econômica. Alguns bravos desenvolvimentistas tem um apreço todo especial pelo mercantilismo... Pragmático, que sou, considero esta pratica compreensivel, mas perigosa já que o comércio internacional não é uma via de mão única, alem de ser um mecanismo fundamental para o bom desempenho da economia mundial.


A história da economia é, em larga medida, uma briga entre duas escolas opostas de pensamento, o "liberalismo" e o "mercantilismo". O liberalismo econômico, com sua ênfase na iniciativa privada e no livre mercado, é hoje a doutrina dominante. Mas a sua vitória intelectual nos cegou para o grande apelo - e frequente sucesso - de práticas mercantilistas. Na verdade, o mercantilismo continua vivo e bem, e seu contínuo conflito com o liberalismo provavelmente será a força que influenciará o futuro da economia mundial.

Atualmente, o mercantilismo é normalmente desconsiderado, taxado de conjunto arcaico e errôneo de ideias sobre política econômica. Em seu auge, os mercantilistas defendiam algumas noções muito estranhas - a principal delas: a visão segundo a qual a política nacional deveria ser norteada pelo acúmulo de metais preciosos - ouro e prata.

"A Riqueza das Nações", o tratado de Adam Smith de 1776, demoliu magistralmente muitas dessas ideias. Em especial, Smith mostrou que dinheiro não deve ser confundido com riqueza. Em suas palavras, "a riqueza de um país consiste não apenas em seu ouro e sua prata, mas em suas terras, casas e bens de consumo de todo tipo".

Mas é mais preciso pensar o mercantilismo como uma forma diferente de organizar a relação entre o Estado e a economia - uma visão não menos importante hoje do que no século XVIII. Teóricos mercantilistas como Thomas Mun eram, na realidade, grandes defensores do capitalismo, apenas propunham um modelo diferente do liberalismo.

O modelo liberal vê o Estado como necessariamente predatório e o setor privado como focado apenas em maximização de lucros, sem quaisquer preocupações de caráter social. Por isso, o modelo liberal defende uma separação rigorosa entre o Estado e o setor privado. O mercantilismo, por outro lado, oferece uma visão corporativista segundo a qual o Estado e as empresas privadas são aliadas e cooperam na busca de objetivos comuns, como o crescimento econômico doméstico ou o poder nacional.

O modelo mercantilista pode ser criticado como sendo capitalismo de Estado ou de compadrio. Mas quando funciona, como tão frequentemente na Ásia, o modelo de "colaboração governo-empresa" ou "Estado incentivador do setor privado" rapidamente acumula elogios entusiásticos. Economias menos desenvolvidas não deixaram de notar que o mercantilismo pode ser seu amigo. Mesmo no Reino Unido, o liberalismo clássico chegou apenas em meados do século XIX - ou seja, depois que o país já havia se tornado a potência industrial dominante do mundo.

Uma segunda diferença entre os dois modelos reside em quais interesses são privilegiados: os do consumidor ou os do produtor? Para os liberais, os consumidores devem reinar. O objetivo último da política econômica é aumentar o potencial de consumo das famílias, o que exige dar a elas livre acesso a bens e serviços os mais baratos possíveis.

Os mercantilistas, em contraste, enfatizam o lado produtivo da economia. Para eles, uma economia sólida requer sólida estrutura de produção. E o consumo precisa se basear em elevados níveis de emprego e salários adequados.

Esses modelos distintos têm implicações previsíveis para as políticas econômicas internacionais. A lógica da abordagem liberal é que os benefícios econômicos do comércio surgem das importações: quanto mais baratas as importações, melhor, mesmo que o resultado seja um déficit comercial. Para os mercantilistas, porém, o comércio é um meio de apoiar a produção nacional e o emprego, e preferem estimular as exportações, e não as importações.

A China é hoje o principal porta-bandeira do mercantilismo, embora os líderes chineses nunca o admitam - o termo ainda é muito estigmatizado. Grande parte do milagre econômico chinês é produto de um governo ativista que tem apoiado, estimulado e subsidiado abertamente produtores industriais - tanto nacionais como estrangeiros.


Embora a China tenha eliminado gradualmente muitos de seus subsídios explícitos à exportação, como condição de aderir à Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC), o sistema de apoio ao mercantilismo persiste. Em especial, o governo administrou a taxa de câmbio para manter a lucratividade dos fabricantes, o que produziu um superávit comercial de considerável dimensão (que, recentemente, encolheu, mas em grande parte como resultado de uma desaceleração econômica). Além disso, as empresas focadas em exportações continuam a beneficiar-se de uma série de incentivos fiscais.

Da perspectiva liberal, esses subsídios à exportação empobrecem os consumidores chineses, beneficiando os consumidores no resto do mundo. Um recente estudo dos economistas Fabrice DeFever e Alejandro Riaño 1 , da Universidade de Nottingham, estima as "perdas", para a China, em cerca de 3% da renda chinesa, e os ganhos, para o resto do mundo, em torno de 1% da renda mundial. Da perspectiva mercantilista, porém, esses são simplesmente os custos de construção de uma economia moderna e da preparação do palco para prosperidade no longo prazo.

Como mostra o exemplo dos subsídios à exportação, os dois modelos podem coexistir harmoniosamente na economia mundial. Os liberais deveriam ficar felizes por terem seu consumo subsidiado pelo mercantilistas.

Com efeito, essa, em resumo, é a história das últimas seis décadas: uma sucessão de países asiáticos conseguiram crescer a passos largos mediante a aplicação de diferentes variantes de mercantilismo. Os governos dos países ricos, em larga medida, mantiveram uma atitude indiferente, enquanto o Japão, a Coreia do Sul, Taiwan e a China protegeram seus mercados domésticos, apropriaram-se de "propriedade intelectual", subsidiaram seus produtores e administraram seus câmbios.

Chegamos agora ao fim dessa feliz coexistência. O modelo liberal é hoje duramente questionado devido ao crescimento da desigualdade e à situação da classe média no Ocidente, juntamente com a crise financeira produzida pela desregulamentação. As perspectivas de crescimento das economias americana e europeia no médio prazo vão de moderadas a sombrias. O desemprego continuará a ser uma grande dor de cabeça e motivo de preocupação para as autoridades econômicas. Assim, as pressões mercantilistas provavelmente se intensificarão nos países avançados.

Em consequência, o novo ambiente econômico produzirá mais tensão do que acomodação entre países que trilham os caminhos liberal e mercantilista. Isso também poderá renovar os dormentes debates sobre o tipo de capitalismo que produz maior prosperidade. (Tradução de Sergio Blum)



Dani Rodrik professor de Economia Política Internacional na Universidade de Harvard


Fonte: Valor