Langoni: 'Não faz sentido o BC usar reservas contra alta do dólar'

Valor: O senhor acha que o BC já deveria ter usado as reservas internacionais para frear o dólar?

Carlos Langoni: Não. Não faz sentido gastar reservas para colocar o dólar num patamar de equilíbrio que ainda não sabemos qual é. As reservas não são sagradas, mas devem ser utilizadas com inteligência. Ainda não sabemos quais serão os próximos passos da política monetária americana: quando o Fed (Federal Reserve, BC americano) começará a reduzir as compras de ativos, quando terminará, quando elevará o juro... Até esse cenário ficar mais claro, melhor desenhado, a volatilidade no câmbio vai continuar. E "queimar" reserva num ambiente com tanta incerteza é um risco. Pode ser um remédio que em dose mais forte mata o paciente. Quando o mercado percebe que você perdeu em uma semana bilhões de dólares em reservas e o dólar se mexeu pouco, ele vai ver isso como um sinal de fragilidade. O mercado achar que vai ter que "queimar" mais. Vira uma bola de neve, uma situação que se retroalimenta. É isso que está acontecendo com a Indonésia. Usar reserva é uma medida muito delicada e que precisa ser bem pensada.

Valor: E em que situação o BC deveria utilizar as reservas?

Langoni: O uso principal das reservas não é para estabelecer patamares para a taxa de câmbio. As reservas são fundamentais para manter a liquidez, a fluidez do crédito, as linhas de financiamento a empresas e bancos. O próprio ajuste na liquidez já facilita a correção de eventuais desequilíbrios no câmbio. Isso foi testado e aprovado no último trimestre de 2008. Naquela época, houve um aperto generalizado do crédito, havia risco sistêmico, as exportadoras não tinham acesso a linhas de comércio exterior, os bancos não queriam emprestar ao sistema. Neste momento, de fato, era necessário vender dólar à vista, para garantir que o sistema não travasse. Agora, não vejo especulação com o real, não há fuga de capital, não há um aperto no crédito que justifique uma intervenção dessa natureza. Os indicadores não mostram uma urgência na venda de dólares à vista.

Valor: A estratégia adotada pelo BC, de realizar leilões programados de swap cambial e de linhas de dólares, é a mais acertada?

Langoni: O BC agiu bem. É uma estratégia inteligente, que cria previsibilidade. E o mercado gosta de previsibilidade. É importante o BC agir para amenizar a alta do dólar por causa da inflação, que em algum momento deve sentir os efeitos dessa puxada do dólar. Acho que o BC busca isso, amenizar o movimento do câmbio, e não revertê-lo. O BC deve agir assim até que as coisas se definam. Tanto a dinâmica interna quanto a externa são complexas. Está todo mundo querendo saber o que o Fed vai fazer. Enquanto isso não ficar claro, enquanto a China continuar preocupando, enquanto o Brasil não fizer as reformas que precisa fazer, a melhor estratégia é oferecer alguma previsibilidade.

Valor: O que poderia ser feito para melhorar as expectativas para a economia de modo geral?

Langoni: O BC teria que elevar os juros mais do que o planejado. Se os mercados continuarem nervosos, o BC vai ter que usar mais esse instrumento. É a arma mais eficaz. Só com uma alta maior do juro é que o BC conseguiria melhorar a expectativa para a inflação corrente e ampliar o diferencial de juros para tentar atrair mais dólares. Seria o primeiro passo para melhorar a consistência de toda a política macroeconômica. Junto a isso, não há como escapar de um ajuste fiscal. Há um consenso de que o governo, com a postura atual, criou uma limitação para gerar mais superávits. De qualquer forma, ainda que tudo isso seja feito, não se pode pensar que o dólar vai voltar para perto de R$ 2,00. Há um ajuste estrutural na taxa de câmbio, já que os tempos de liquidez farta e preços das commodities inflados pelo visto vão ficar no passado. A médio prazo, o governo precisa dar condições para o setor de petróleo poder ampliar os investimentos.

Valor: É possível o Brasil voltar a ter juros de dois dígitos?

Langoni: Não descarto a chance de a Selic voltar a dois dígitos no início do ano que vem. Mas não porque o BC intensificaria o ritmo do aperto monetário, mas sim a duração, com doses de alta de 0,50 ponto percentual. Haveria dois efeitos positivos nisso: um impacto direto na volatilidade do câmbio, com tempo para a balança comercial reagir à alta do dólar. Além disso, você ataca frontalmente a inflação. A inflação tem um componente de represamento que você só consegue atacar se melhorar a expectativa, e uma das formas é elevar mais o juro. É claro que a atividade poderia ser impactada negativamente pelo juro maior, mas talvez o benefício da melhora nas expectativas para a inflação e câmbio possa equilibrar o jogo.

Fonte: Valor

Nada de novo no front monetário....

Como era esperado o Copom elevou a Selic em 0,5 ponto porcentual, atingindo 9% ao ano. O dolar em alta e o provável reajuste dos combustiveis, argumentam alguns analistas, aumentam a probabilidade da Selic chegar a 10% ainda este ano. A minha aposta, antes da reunião de ontem, era 9.75& e ainda acredito ser este o resultado mais provável para o corrente ano. O Governo Dilma parece realmente preocupado com o risco inflacionário e por isto não sei se estará disposto a permitir o reajuste dos combustiveis se o dolar manter-se em movimento ascendente. Posterga-lo, não me parece ser uma boa idéia, mas a atual administração tem um certa queda por comportar-se como uma avestruz.

Enquanto o Bacen, se esforça por recuperar a credibilidade perdida com a sucessão de equivocos iniciada em 2011, os neo-desenvolvimentistas mantem-se em silêncio, quem sabe, devido ao estado de choque causado pelo fracasso da estratégia por eles cantada em verso e prosa. O câmbio ainda é o objeto de desejo e curiosamente,a taxa ótima que, segundo um conhecido lider desta peculiar seita, estava em torno de 3 reais, despencou para 2,40: este seria o piso para o cambio circulante. Outros, menos sofisticados, diante da realização do sonho dourado, entraram em pânico e agora apontam o risco inflacionário do atual patamar do câmbio.

Chico Lopes: 'Banco Central tem que mostrar quem manda'

Em algum momento ocorrerá uma inevitável correção para cima na cotação do dólar, com alta probabilidade de se transformar numa traumática "parada súbita". A pressão desse ajuste vai trazer de volta a inflação e exigir nova elevação da taxa Selic. Se for um ajuste súbito, haverá também uma freada no crescimento.

A avaliação foi feita em junho de 2011, pelo ex-presidente do Banco Central (BC) e atual sócio da consultoria Macrométrica, Francisco Lopes, em artigo para uma série especial do Valor sobre câmbio, juros e inflação.

No artigo intitulado "Sobre risco cambial, besouros e borboletas", Lopes criticou a forma de construção das reservas internacionais e apontou a formação de uma autêntica "bolha especulativa" nas reservas que poderia estourar entre 2013 e 2105 com graves consequências.

Passados mais de dois anos do artigo, Lopes aponta que o momento atual não é exatamente aquele previsto por ele, mas pondera que a avaliação feita em 2011 serve de pano de fundo para a problemática atual.

Como as reservas foram construídas, em grande parte, com dívida, diz Lopes, elas estão sujeitas aos financiadores demandarem seu dinheiro de volta. "É uma contingência que tem de ser contemplada. A grande atração para a entrada de dinheiro foi o diferencial de juros interno e externo e um ambiente de muita liquidez internacional. Esse é o cenário que pode mudar", afirma.

Retomando o artigo, Lopes escreveu, em 2011, que uma das poucas coisas que o governo poderia fazer diante da perspectiva de um inevitável ajuste cambial no futuro era preparar seus planos de contingência para um amortecimento da desvalorização. "Em particular, tanto o Banco Central como outras áreas mais politizadas do governo têm que estar psicologicamente preparadas para entregar aos 'malditos especuladores' o butim resultante de suas operações cambiais no país, sendo que isso poderá significar a perda de um grande e imprevisível volume de reservas internacionais (metade das reservas, por exemplo?)", escreveu em 2011.

Esse é o ponto central agora, diz Lopes, o BC pode sim administrar o ajuste no câmbio, mas, para isso, tem de operar com determinação tanto no mercado à vista como no de derivativos.

A valorização atual do dólar não é caracterizada por uma demanda por hedge (proteção). "Tem contornos de um ataque especulativo", diz, ponderando que embora não haja forte saída de recursos do país, o especulador se baseia nessa possibilidade.

De fato, diz Lopes, há um movimento especulativo em diversos países emergentes, como Índia, Indonésia e África do Sul. São países que têm situação vulnerável na parte fiscal, no balanço de pagamentos e passarão, como o Brasil, por eleições em 2014.

"No caso Brasileiro tem outra vulnerabilidade que é o fato de o governo resolver considerar que as reservas internacionais são sagradas, não se pode perder um tostão. É o que chamo de sacralização das reservas", diz Lopes, que tratou do tema em texto enviado a clientes sob o título: "O problema do câmbio ou como não se afogar em poça d'água".

Segundo Lopes, o problema dessa postura é que o governo atua como se não tivesse as reservas e assim, o mercado e os especuladores fazem o movimento que querem. Para Lopes, o dólar verde-amarelo produzido pelas operações de swap está longe de ser um substituto perfeito para o dólar verdadeiro. "A ideia de que operar com swap é o mesmo que operar com reservas é um equívoco", diz.

Com os swaps e os leilões de linha não há saída de moeda das reservas, o que BC faz é estimular o próprio sistema financeiro a prover os dólares para quem quer proteção, especulação ou mesmo sair do país. Mas esse é um modelo frágil, diz.

"Todo mundo com experiência no mercado diz que se o BC quer defender a taxa de câmbio, não quer que ocorra movimentos descontrolados, ele tem de mostrar firmeza no mercado à vista. As operações de swap são tímidas. O Brasil está sofrendo uma ilusão achando que controla o câmbio só com swaps. Isso é muito arriscado", diz.

Para o economista, com o dólar rodando a R$ 2,40, ou buscando R$ 2,50 conforme algumas projeções, os impactos inflacionários serão muito dramáticos.

Nos cenários desenhados por ele, a inflação chega a picos de 8% em 2014, considerando um câmbio a R$ 2,50. Na casa de R$ 2,40, o IPCA para este ano iria a 5,95%, e subiria 7,21% em 2014.

"Não pode ter uma posição de que as reservas são sagradas. Tem reservas é para poder usar. O BC tem que mostrar que ele manda nesse mercado. Não pode ficar em uma posição de medo. Se ele ficar assim é atacado", diz.

Essa é a questão de "se afogar em poça d'água", diz Lopes, apontando que com a posição de reservas de mais de US$ 370 bilhões, o BC pode colocar a taxa onde desejar. "O BC pode se perguntar que inflação quer ter, ver qual o câmbio compatível e operar a taxa de câmbio. Se ele for tímido, medroso, ele está dando sinal de que não é prioritário para ele defender o câmbio", explica.

Para o economista, a taxa de câmbio atual já é muito ruim para o cenário de inflação. "Com essa taxa já podemos ir acima da meta. O que o BC vai fazer? Levar a Selic para 15% para compensar isso? O governo vai fazer ajuste fiscal?", questiona.

Ele aponta, ainda, que o Brasil conta com uma posição de reservas internacionais quase US$ 200 bilhões maior que a observada no fim de 2008. Segundo Lopes, mesmo que o BC perca até US$ 100 bilhões em reservas não haveria problema nenhum.

"Perder US$ 100 bilhões de reservas, com isso você mata qualquer especulador e voltamos ao nível de reservas de 2010. Não tem problema algum", diz, questionando se o país precisa mesmo de US$ 370 bilhões em reservas "para sobreviver".

"O BC não pode perder o controle da taxa de câmbio como perdeu porque opera timidamente no mercado cambial."


Fonte: Valor

Patriota

Se já não bastassem os desencontros na área econômica, o Governo Dilma, ao demitir o Ministro Patriota, acrescenta mais um item na sua lista de atrapalhadas, que parece ser a sua marca registrada. Que falta comando no Itamaraty, não é nenhuma novidade: ele é um dos últimos redutos - alguns diriam sinecura - de uma elite retrograda que parece envergonhar-se de ser brasileira. Dai a demitir um Ministro para agradar um país que faz parte do quintal brasileiro é demonstrar uma enorme ignorância em questões de política externa, além de confirmar a inexistênca de um projeto consistente com a importância que o país adquiriu, nos últimos anos, no cenário internacional. É um absurdo que o Chefe de Estado e de Governo de um país que pleiteia um cadeira no conselho permanente da ONU não consiga resolver um problema banal na área externa. Pior ainda: a atual administração tem sido extremamente compreensiva com o comportamento nem sempre adequado do mandatário boliviano. Há limites para tudo, inclusive a quantidade de sapos engolidos, principalmente, quando não justificados pela defesa do interesse nacional brasileiro. Este é um detalhe esquecido pela atual administração e desde sempre pelo Itamaraty.

Vergonha

Dado que a oferta domestica de medicos para os rincões e regiôes pobres das áreas metropolitana é menor que a demanda, é plenamente justificado o programa "medicos sem fonteira" do Governo Federal. A reação da corporação médica já era esperada, já que a sua maior preocupação sempre foi a defesa de privilégios, haja vista, por ex, sua posição contrária ao aumento da oferta de vagas e ou aumento no número de faculdades de medicina. A oposição - mais perdida que nunca-, procura, sem muito sucesso ate o momento, encontrar brechas juridicas para detonar o programa. Comportamento infeliz, mas, parte do jogo político.

O governo erra apenas na questão do contrato de trabalho dos medicos cubanos que, como os demais profissionais, são muito bem vindos. É lamentável aceitar a terceirizzção que implica em menor salãrio aos cubanos: a maior parte ficará com a ditadura cubana que não contente com isto, não permite, também, que o medico venha com sua familia. Concordar com isto, é coloborar com a sobrevida da ditadura da familia castro e com praticas que em outros países - e ate mesmo no grande bananão - seriam consideradas inaceitáveis, por se aproximarem, perigosamente, do trabalho escravo. Opor-se ao contrato de trabalho dos medicos cubanos não é uma questão menor, já que trata-se da negação dos direitos humanos desses medicos.

Entrevista com Philip Arestis

Valor: Uma das discussões no Brasil, hoje, é o perigo de aceleração da inflação e como isso compromete o crescimento do país. Como o senhor vê essa relação?

Philip Arestis: Em termos gerais, entre inflação e crescimento do PIB há uma relação negativa, mas também existe uma relação positiva. Estudos importantes do Fundo Monetário Internacional sugerem que, quando a inflação não é maior do que dois dígitos (superior a 10%), essa relação é positiva. E quando há taxa de inflação maior do que isso, então a relação pode se tornar facilmente negativa. Nos países onde se dá o primeiro caso, deveria haver preocupação maior com outros elementos da economia, que importam mais do que a inflação, como o crescimento do PIB, aumento da taxa de emprego e a redução da taxa de desemprego, entre outros. Quando há inflação, por exemplo, acima de 20%, como ocorreu no Reino Unido nos anos 1970, o governo, naquele momento, adotou uma política que foi bem-sucedida por um período, de controle de aumento de salários e de preços.

Valor: E sobre o Brasil?

Arestis: No caso do Brasil, existe uma meta de inflação de 4,5%, podendo a taxa se situar dois pontos acima ou abaixo. Se for de 2,5% ou 6,5%, não há muito motivo para se preocupar. A inflação está hoje ligeiramente acima de 6,5%. Mas acho que a taxa de inflação no momento não é um problema sério, já que está abaixo de dois dígitos.

Valor: O senhor é crítico do regime de metas de inflação adotado por diferentes países....

Arestis: Acho que existem problemas com esse tipo de regime. Antes da crise financeira de 2007, os países que perseguiam metas de inflação pareciam ser bem-sucedidos. Mas os dados mostram: antes de agosto de 2007, países que não perseguiam metas de inflação estavam também indo bem, tão bem quanto os que perseguiam essas metas, e algumas vezes até melhor. Nossa conclusão é que, antes de agosto de 2007, a globalização, a influência da China e de outros países mantiveram a inflação baixa e sob controle.
Valor: Quais países que não perseguem metas de inflação neste momento merecem ser mencionados?

Arestis: Os Estados Unidos são o melhor exemplo. O ato de reforma do Federal Reserve (Fed), de 1977, não fala em metas de inflação, mas sugere que o banco central deve perseguir estabilidade de preços e, ao mesmo tempo, precisa se preocupar com o crescimento econômico, taxa de desemprego baixa e taxa de juros estável. Mesmo considerando que o Fed estipula a taxa de juros básica da economia, isso não é o mesmo que uma política de metas de inflação. A União Europeia é outro exemplo interessante. Embora exista uma meta de menos de 2% de inflação, também se dá atenção ao crescimento da oferta de dinheiro em circulação na economia. É uma informação adicional para a estabilidade no médio e longo prazos. Isso é um pouco diferente dos sistemas de metas de inflação puros.

Valor: O senhor recomenda que o regime de metas de inflação deve ser abandonado?

Arestis: Sim, e não sou o único a dizer isso. No regime de metas, há um único instrumento, que é a taxa de juros, e um único objetivo, que é a estabilidade de preços. Deveríamos ter uma coordenação entre política monetária e política fiscal e, aliada a isso, instrumentos de estabilidade financeira. Coordenação significa as autoridades monetárias e fiscais se orientarem por objetivos comuns. E é preciso ter mais objetivos do que simplesmente a estabilidade de preços, como o pleno emprego, que é muito importante, assim como o crescimento sustentável do PIB. Não sugiro que se ignore a inflação completamente, mas existe um ponto em que a inflação talvez não seja o grande problema que as pessoas acham que é. E, nesse caso, a meta de inflação não é o regime certo a ser usado.

Valor: Entre as lições importantes da crise está esse novo modo de tratar a macroeconomia?

Arestis: Antes de 2007, a economia e os bancos centrais de diversos países aceitavam o preceito teórico que nos deu o regime de metas de inflação, consubstanciado no que se passou a denominar "novo consenso macroeconômico". Segundo essa corrente de pensamento, deve haver apenas um objetivo da política macroeconômica [estabilidade de preços] e apenas um instrumento para isso [manipulação da taxa de juros]. O banco central deve mirar a taxa de curto prazo e a taxa de médio e longo prazos deve ser deixada para um ajuste do próprio mercado. Essa crença foi posta em xeque, porque o mercado às vezes produz problemas. O abandono do regime de metas de inflação, passando-se a ter mais instrumentos e mais objetivos, é provavelmente a melhor lição a extrair dessa experiência. Outra lição é que as autoridades devem se importar mais com a estabilidade financeira.

Valor: O que se deve entender por estabilidade financeira?

Arestis: A estabilidade procurada pode ser microprudencial, quando há preocupação com indivíduos e instituições específicas, ou macropudencial, quando nos preocupamos com todo o sistema financeiro. Essa preocupação, em particular, não existia antes de agosto de 2007. Mas alguns países têm levado isso mais a sério atualmente. O Banco da Inglaterra, por exemplo, criou o Comitê de Estabilidade Financeira, que se preocupa com o que ocorre com todo o sistema financeiro. Esse tipo de coordenação é muito mais importante do que uma meta de inflação. É importante para a estabilidade macroeconômica e para o crescimento. Se um país persegue apenas metas de inflação, não garante a estabilidade econômica. Prova disso é que, antes de 2007, por exemplo, autoridades do Fed diziam que vivíamos o período da Grande Moderação [fase de baixa volatilidade da economia americana, a partir dos anos 1980], e o presidente do Banco da Inglaterra afirmava que vivíamos em um período sem grande expansão da inflação, denominado Nice [sigla em inglês para "non-inflationary, consistently expansionary"]. De repente, em agosto de 2007, tivemos essa horrível instabilidade que deu inicio à crise, que ainda sofremos.

Valor: As autoridades monetárias e fiscais estão prestando mais atenção na estabilidade financeira depois da crise?

Arestis: Posso dar alguns exemplos. Nos Estados Unidos, de fevereiro ou março de 2008 até janeiro de 2009, houve tantos problemas com o setor bancário que o governo, o Fed e os comitês, no Congresso, estavam muito ocupados resolvendo os problemas dos bancos. Alguns estavam falindo, outros eram vendidos e houve tentativas do governo e do Fed de estabilizar o sistema financeiro porque perceberam a importância da estabilidade financeira geral. Sabiam que, sem ajuda e intervenção, instituições financeiras poderiam produzir não só outros problemas, como uma segunda recessão, ainda pior. No Reino Unido, a criação do Comitê de Estabilidade Financeira mostrou que as autoridades sabem que precisam colocar em evidência a estabilidade financeira. Os Estados Unidos produziram uma lista de mudanças que deveriam ser feitas para evitar outra crise dessa magnitude e elaboraram o Dodd-Frank Act, em 2010, que tem propostas para a estabilidade financeira. Mas não tenho visto muito mais esforços do que isso, nem nos Estados Unidos nem no Reino Unido. Temos evidências de que estão tentando, mas ainda não observamos mudanças reais e substanciais.
Valor: E por que é assim?

Arestis: Isso requer mudanças importantes. Mas tanto nos Estados Unidos quanto no Reino Unido o sistema financeiro não está feliz com essas alterações e produz argumentos contrários.

Valor: Se fossem implementadas, essas mudanças evitariam no futuro uma crise similar à de 2007?

Arestis: Não evitariam, mas seria melhor que fossem implementadas. Na minha opinião, deveriam ser feitas outras coisas, como separar mais detalhadamente as atividades de bancos comerciais das dos bancos de investimentos. Em 1933, o Glass-Steagall Act estabeleceu essa separação. Daí em diante, não houve problemas financeiros nos Estados Unidos, com apenas uma exceção, em 1965, quando um pequeno banco entrou em colapso. Nada parecido, portanto, com o que ocorreu entre 2007 e 2009. Devemos olhar mais para esse passado e aprender mais sobre o Glass-Steagall Act, revogado pelo presidente Bill Clinton em 1999.

Valor: Por que países ainda resistem e não abandonam a política de metas de inflação?

Arestis: Existe a crença de que o tamanho do setor público deve ser administrado por políticas que limitem a importância de seu papel na economia. Por trás disso está a ideia de que o setor privado é estável e o setor público, instável. Quanto menos o setor instável interferir no estável, menos problemas existirão. Se você deixar tudo para o setor estável, em suma, o mercado vai criar bem-estar. Muitas pessoas acreditam nessas hipóteses, o que pode explicar por que diferentes países preferem não usar política fiscal. Se for feita essa opção, os agentes econômicos, que são racionais e têm expectativas racionais - e sabem como a economia opera -, imaginam que vão pagar no futuro taxas maiores por causa de um aumento do déficit do governo no presente, em razão dos gastos maiores. Então, reduziriam seus gastos hoje, para pagar maiores impostos no futuro (necessários para cobrir o aumento do déficit público). Dessa forma, nada aconteceria em termos de impacto da política fiscal no crescimento econômico. Aquela racionalidade não é, porém, consensual. Muitos não acreditam que as pessoas são totalmente racionais e acreditam, claro, que o déficit do governo pode ser importante para ajudar nos problemas da economia, como o desemprego.

Valor: A política fiscal ficou em evidência com a crise, mas depois houve um certo ceticismo em relação ao seu uso...

Arestis: Na reunião do G-20 de abril de 2009, decidiu-se recomendar o uso da política fiscal para evitar mais consequências negativas da crise iniciada em 2007. Essa tentativa em particular nos salvou de uma segunda Grande Depressão [como a dos anos 1930] e só tivemos uma Grande Recessão. Mas, de repente, as pessoas decidiram que a política fiscal poderia não ser a forma certa de agir e isso teve a ver com mudanças nos governos de vários países, que elegeram presidentes mais conservadores. Em 2009, houve também algumas implicações do uso da política fiscal no crescimento do déficit dos governos, que decidiram passar a evitar esse caminho para reduzir o déficit. Mas acho que isso é um grande erro porque, como vemos hoje na Europa, existe uma área periférica, Grécia, Portugal, Espanha e Chipre, que está sofrendo muito por causa desse tipo de ideia.

Valor: Há outros exemplos, na história, que deveriam ser olhados, de governos que fizeram uso amplo da política fiscal?

Arestis: Em 1816, no Reino Unido, depois das Guerras Napoleônicas, chegou-se a uma relação dívida/PIB de 250%. As pessoas, naquela época, incluindo Adam Smith, defendiam o recuo imediato dos gastos. Mas o governo decidiu que continuaria a acelerar os gastos, sob o argumento de que a expansão da economia reduziria a dívida no futuro. Em 1865, houve de fato um crescimento econômico vigoroso e a dívida caiu de modo correspondente. Crescer é, provavelmente, a melhor forma de reduzir a relação dívida/PIB. Mais do que a austeridade.

Valor: O momento agora é de recuperação da Europa e dos Estados Unidos? O senhor diria que os países que compõem os Brics perderam uma oportunidade de crescer mais?

Arestis: Quando os Estados Unidos e a Europa estavam indo bem, os Brics iam bem. E eles ainda não sofreram tanto quanto a Europa ou os Estados Unidos. O Brasil tem crescido, ainda que a taxas menores. A China diminuiu seu crescimento, a Índia tem taxas menores agora e a Rússia teve alguns problemas, mas não são iguais aos problemas da Europa. Esses países têm dificuldades por causa da situação da Europa no momento e porque a China não tem se saído tão bem quanto poderia. Mas o nível de crescimento do PIB na Zona do Euro [de 0,3% no segundo trimestre do ano] não pode ser generalizado. O próximo indicador pode vir ruim. Há taxas de desemprego muito altas ainda em vários países. Na Grécia, por exemplo, está em 27%. Na Espanha, 26%. Claro que há um ou dois países que vão bem, como Alemanha e França, e que produzem aquele aumento do PIB regional. Mas, se olharmos bem o que ocorre na Europa, esse 0,3% não diz nada. Há sérios problemas que devem ser analisados mais de perto.


Fonte: Valor

Gillian Tett: Central bank chiefs need to master the art of storytelling

What skills does the next chairman of the US Federal Reserve really need? A decade ago, the answer seemed clear: political acumen, excellent economic knowledge, and the ability to analyse reams of statistics to deliver effective monetary policy responses. But if Douglas Holmes, a professor of anthropology, is correct, the Fed chairman needs something else, too: the linguistic and cultural skills of a preacher-cum-therapist.
The reason? During the past decade, Prof Holmes has been conducting research inside central banks to understand their cultural and social dynamics. In particular, he has analysed how central bankers across the world have tried to control inflation through actions and (most importantly) ritualistic statements. The research is unusually timely, as investors digest the latest Fed minutes – and economists, policy makers and journalists gather for the annual central banking conference in Jackson Hole.
In a forthcoming article in the Cornell Law Review, one of Prof Holmes’ conclusions is that many of us use the wrong yardstick for judging central banks. The issue is how we think the economy works (or does not). In popular discussions, it is often presumed that the financial system is like a machine. Thus central bankers are depicted as economic engineers: they judge what is happening in the economy by reading dials, and control it by pulling levers that affect the price or supply of money.
This clearly does not match reality, however. In the past decade, particularly since the crisis began, central bankers have increasingly been forced to recognise that economies are also shaped by mood swings. So central bankers are now trying to read this by using non-qualitative sources. Prof Holmes describes, for example, how central bankers in England, Canada and New Zealand gather “intelligence”
(ie anecdotes) from “the field”.
He writes: “Like his colleagues at the Bank of England, Governor Bollard, [former head of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand] was in the “field” each month travelling . . . to businesses . . . The governor and his staff communicate central bank policy during these visits but they also actively solicit stories – anecdotal data.”
Rather than operating the controls, moreover, central bankers also try to control economic outcomes by using words, not merely to influence price and interest rate expectations but to shape the mood. Thus the seemingly dry ritualistic texts that are issued each month – and supplemented by sober speeches – no longer merely describe policy; they are creating it too. Words are the weapon.
Janet Yellen, the vice-chair of the Fed, has articulated this shift particularly clearly. Earlier this year Ms Yellen, who is one of the leading candidates to be next chair of the central bank, observed that August 12 2003, the moment when the Fed started issuing regular statements, was a watershed. “On that date the [Federal Open Market] Committee [started] using communication – mere words – as its primary monetary policy tool,” she said. “Until then, it was probably common to think of communication about future policy as something that supplemented the setting of the federal funds rate . . . [But now] communication [is] an independent and effective tool for influencing the economy . . . explanation is the policy.”
The Bank of England’s embrace of inflation targeting, supplemented with forward guidance, echoes this pattern. So too, in Sweden, Canada and New Zealand. At the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi has been masterful at delivering economic outcomes through words, as much as deeds. Indeed, what is most striking is that Mr Draghi has managed to reframe public discourse about the euro not so much by what he has said but what he implicitly persuaded us to assume.
Of course, linguistic spells do not always work. The new BoE governor Mark Carney’s verbal experiments with forward guidance, for example, have had mixed results. But the key point is this: what is underpinning the financial system these days is not so much a tangible benchmark (such as a gold standard) but an intangible issue of “public trust”.
“[This] is about the creation of a monetary regime – a regime impelled by a series of communicative experiments . . . in which we are all participants, knowingly or not,” Prof Holmes argues. It is, he says, now defined “by the concept of a ‘public currency’, a term used in passing by Mervyn King, [former] governor of the Bank of England.” Central bankers now operate in an area where linguists, psychologists – and even anthropologists – know as much as economists.
This may sound irritatingly abstract to investors but it has at least two practical consequences. First, it suggests that we all need to spend more time reflecting on the implicit social contract and cultural messages in central bank statements.
Second, when President Barack Obama picks the next Fed chair – be that Ms Yellen, Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, or anyone else – it is no longer good enough to choose the economic equivalent of a mechanical engineer; nor “just” a brilliant academic or manager. The next Fed chair also needs to be a masterful storyteller and cultural analyst, who can read social sentiment, shape norms, (re)create trust and persuade us all to think in a manner that suits the Fed’s economic goals, without us even noticing.
Somebody, in other words, who can cast spells with both their spreadsheets and words. In short, what is needed is nothing less than a monetary shaman.

Gillian Tett

Fonte: FT

Entrevista com Thomas Sargent

Valor: Quase cinco anos depois do colapso do Lehman Brothers, o desemprego nos EUA continua alto. Isso se deve a motivos cíclicos ou estruturais?

Thomas Sargent: Em parte pelos dois. Os EUA estão de acordo com um padrão empírico que mostra que recuperações de recessões acompanhadas por crises bancárias são muito mais lentas que recuperações de recessões "normais", não acompanhadas por crises bancárias. No entanto, questões estruturais provavelmente também contribuem para o lento declínio do desemprego. Um fator estrutural é que os EUA aumentaram a duração do benefício de desemprego de 26 semanas para um período muito maior. Embora seja compreensível como uma política de compaixão, estender a duração do seguro-desemprego tem efeitos adversos não desejados sobre os incentivos para trabalhadores desempregados buscarem e aceitarem empregos. Outros fatores estruturais talvez se devam à situação do mercado imobiliário, que torna difícil para as pessoas se mudarem de localidade.
Valor: Quais as melhores políticas para enfrentar o desemprego?

Sargent: Provavelmente algo na linha do que fez o governo de Gerhard Schroeder na Alemanha no começo dos anos 2000 ao pensar em caminhos para reduzir o desemprego estrutural, e evitar o seu surgimento. O desemprego estrutural é um problema muito mais custoso porque ele é persistente. Felizmente, os economistas e outras pessoas entendem muito mais do desemprego estrutural do que sobre o cíclico. Políticas que aumentam a flexibilidade do mercado de trabalho e que ajustam os incentivos dos subsídios públicos ao desemprego e incapacidade física são fundamentais aqui.

Valor: O Fed adotou uma política monetária muito expansionista nos últimos anos, com os juros básicos próximos de zero e uma política agressiva de compra de ativos. Ela é apropriada para o pós-crise?

Sargent: Essa é uma questão complicada por causa das teorias em que banqueiros centrais e economistas monetários confiam tanto para duvidar como para apoiar os programas de compras de ativos. Há um famoso "teorema" devido a Neil Wallace que diz que, sob algumas condições específicas, esses programas de compra de ativos são irrelevantes. Eles não fazem bem ou mal. Se você ler o discurso de Bernanke, na conferência do ano passado em Jackson Hole, o "teorema" de Wallace era um esqueleto no armário que o preocupava. Bernanke e outros defensores do afrouxamento quantitativo apontam para o que consideram violações das condições presumidas por Wallace. Mas se essas violações de fato ocorrem ou se aplicam é algo complicado de se verificar. Esse é o motivo pelo qual há espaço legítimo para debater e duvidar dessa política. Uma coisa curiosa sobre o debate é que, embora os defensores do afrouxamento quantitativo se distanciem do "teorema" da irrelevância de Wallace, na entrada do programa, eles frequentemente apontam para o teorema de Wallace quando descrevem uma "estratégia de saída". Se você ouvir com atenção às autoridades quando elas explicam por que eles não estão preocupados com a saída do QE, eles invocam partes do argumento da irrelevância de Wallace.

Valor: Muitos analistas, inclusive do FMI, veem muita consolidação fiscal no curto prazo nos EUA, e apontam a falta de uma trajetória crível no longo prazo. O sr. compartilha dessas visões sobre política fiscal ou acha que é o momento para apertar as contas públicas?

Sargent: Economistas simplesmente não sabem muito sobre os efeitos das diferenças do timing dos ajustes fiscais. Modelos que dizem oferecer um caminho detalhado sobre o timing não são estimados com precisão estatística suficiente para inspirar a nossa confiança. Nós sabemos muito mais sobre os efeitos de programas amplos. Economistas e autoridades que fazem afirmações sobre a política fiscal ser mais frouxa no curto prazo, mas mais apertada no longo, estão se arriscando intelectualmente. Mas talvez venda bem politicamente.

Valor: Nos últimos anos, houve discussões duras entre democratas e republicanos sobre o orçamento, elevando a incerteza sobre o panorama fiscal. Como isso afeta as expectativas de consumidores e empresários?

Sargent: Eu não sei. Políticas fiscais têm que ser factíveis e sustentáveis, independentemente do que as leis atuais de um país prometam. As leis americanas atuais fazem promessas que não são factíveis. Algumas delas terão que ser quebradas (por exemplo, alguns impostos serão elevados e/ou alguns gastos e programas sociais terão de ser cortados). Isso é certo. A incerteza é sobre quais benefícios serão reduzidos ou impostos serão aumentados.

Valor: Depois da crise, houve algum reforço da regulação financeira. Em que medida passos como a lei Dodd-Frank pode reduzir o risco de outra grande crise financeira?

Sargent: A lei Dodd-Frank é muito longa e complicada. Eu suspeito que a maior parte dos congressistas que a aprovaram não a leu, ou nem uma pequena parte dela. Muitas recomendações são vagas e ambíguas. É difícil saber quais efeitos a lei Dodd-Frank terá. No século XIX, o Congresso americano aprovou leis que tinham entre uma e cinco páginas. A Dodd-Frank tem 800 páginas, e muitas partes são difíceis de entender.

Valor: O Brasil tem hoje uma combinação de inflação alta, baixo crescimento e uma política fiscal considerada expansionista por muitos analistas. O sr. tem algum conselho para o ministro da Fazenda do Brasil, como o sr. já fez no passado [Sargent escreveu em 1986 e 1993 cartas abertas aos ministros da Fazenda brasileiros]?

Sargent: A minha política nos dias atuais é não dar conselho a outros países até que as autoridades fiscais do meu próprio país coloquem a casa em ordem. Conselhos sobre políticas fiscal e monetária vindos de um cidadão americano não são muito críveis hoje em dia.

Fonte: Valor

Rupee tumbles as India concerns grow and emerging markets turmoil builds

Acabou a festa...


The 20 biggest emerging market currencies tumbled against the US dollar on Monday with India’s rupee particularly badly hit amid mounting market turmoil in the developing world.
The rupee slumped to a fresh all-time low against the backdrop of deepening concerns over the government’s economic management. The 2.4 per cent fall to a record 63.2 to the dollar took the currency’s slump against the US dollar this year to 12 per cent.
Monday’s moves in India came alongside grim news from emerging economies and further evidence of how the US Federal Reserve’s plan to end its monetary stimulus has continued to hit stocks, bonds and currencies across the developing world.
Over the past six months, China’s heavily managed renminbi is the only significant emerging market currency to have managed to hold its ground against a resurgent dollar.
Fears over the impact of the Fed’s plans to scale down its bond purchases have been compounded by slowing economic growth and deteriorating fiscal fundamentals in many countries. Investors are particularly concerned by states with current account deficits that have been plugged by inflows of more flighty investor capital, rather than stickier foreign direct investment.
“It’s the current account deficit countries that are in the most trouble,” said Angus Halkett, a bond fund manager at Stone Harbor Investment Partners. “The market is becoming a lot choosier where it puts its money, and some countries are going to find it tough.”
Indonesia provided evidence of that on Monday as its main equities index fell by 5.6 per cent after the country’s central bank reported on Friday that its current account deficit had widened sharply in the second quarter of this year.
New numbers on Monday also showed how the growth equation is changing for emerging economies with Thailand’s economy slipping into a technical recession thanks to weak exports and sluggish domestic demand.
But India remains the biggest concern for many investors with the pessimism there driven by questions about the government’s economic management following its introduction of a number of failed measures to support the currency, some of which appear to have exacerbated the country’s problems.
Only the Brazilian real and the South African rand have recorded bigger declines than the rupee in 2013. India’s benchmark Sensex share index also fell by nearly 2 per cent while 10-year bond yields pushed above 9 per cent, their highest level since the 2008 financial crisis.
The burgeoning crisis in India has also become increasingly political with senior figures from the opposition Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party declaring on Monday that the only way out was for the government to call early elections, now due to be held by May 2014.
“The government seems to have lost control over the economy. Nothing they are doing is helping,” Yashwant Sinha, a former BJP finance minister and party leader, told the Financial Times. “There is a trust deficit, a crisis of confidence that can only be sorted out through the political process.” Calling for new elections would “stabilise the markets”, he said.
The call for an early poll was echoed by some close to the Congress party. Sanjaya Baru, a former adviser to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, said early elections would remove the sense of drift hanging over the economy.
“People are just watching and waiting. What India needs is to revive investment, but I don’t see that investment revival until a new government is in place,” he said.
Mr Singh, an economist, over the weekend sought to soothe nerves by insisting that India was far from a replaying of the 1991 balance of payments crisis. His supporters argue that, with foreign reserves now able to cover six months of imports versus just two months on the cusp of the 1991 crisis, India is in a much better place than it was then to handle market turmoil.
But analysts said the government response remained insufficient.
Jahangir Aziz, chief Asia economist for JPMorgan, said the government needed to do much more to win over the markets. “They are giving a sense that they don’t have any options left when in reality they do have options and they need to put them on the table,” he said.
The government last week issued capital controls on overseas investments by Indian companies and individuals to staunch currency outflows. But it needed to attract capital, Mr Aziz said, through measures including liberalising restrictive rules that prevent long-term foreign investors from buying Indian government and corporate bonds.
“They have only taken steps to stop money from going out. They have to worry about bringing money in,” he said.

Fonte: FT

Ian Bremmer: Barack Obama declines to correct his Egypt mistake

Não estou nenhum um pouco surpreso com a reação do Obama aos tristes e lamentáveis eventos no Egito. Ele já havia recusado a usar a expressão golpe de estado e ,juntamente com lideres do velho continente, observado um silencio vergonhoso quando do primeiro massacre. Vivemos em um mundo sem estadistas, povoado por mediocres carreiristas sem pensamento próprio- papagaios do marketing político. Tempos sombrios.

President Barack Obama has decided not to bring his influence to bear on Egypt. In a statement on Thursday, he spoke out against this week’s violence in the country and cancelled forthcoming joint military exercises, declaring that “our traditional co-operation cannot continue as usual.” But in effect, business as usual was what he championed. These were largely symbolic gestures that did not undermine implicit US support for the Egyptian military.
America’s link to the generals is longstanding. That is the backdrop for the decision to acquiesce in July’s military coup against the Egyptian president, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi. It was a significant foreign policy misstep, compounded by the Obama administration’s subsequent statements and decisions. In early August John Kerry, secretary of state, described the military as “restoring democracy”. At the time it was incorrect. This week, it has become a stain on the White House.
On Wednesday the Egyptian authorities moved against the Brotherhood, who had organised protests against the coup. The violence escalated; some of the opposition were armed. More than 500 people have died. The Islamists have attacked churches and police stations across the country. The pro-military and pro-Brotherhood factions are now too polarised for any compromise to take shape. How can you broker a deal when the two sides are digging in deeper?
The issue is less about whether or not there was a military coup in July but rather why the revolution in 2011 failed to take root. Depending on how you look at it, the revolution was incomplete, unsuccessful, or, more cynically, it never got rolling to begin with. That’s not a narrative that people like to hear. The military wasn’t “restoring democracy” in July because democracy never managed to take root in the first place; the military didn’t give up power. There was change – some generals were replaced – and there was hope for more. But to say the military ever reported to the new administration and then overthrew it is fiction. The military retained enormous political and budgetary authority, and the Brotherhood-written constitution codified its power.
Still, there was a real possibility that things would improve, albeit incrementally, as happened in Turkey in the 1990s. An elected government could have come in, beholden to the military, but over time, it could have stripped the military of its vested powers and the country could have lurched towards true democracy. This is the Egypt spring scenario: a trajectory that was plausible had Mr Morsi built out a broad governing coalition capable of addressing Egypt’s underlying power structure. But in November 2012 Mr Morsi declared himself above the law and served as the mouthpiece for an organisation that was (and is) in many ways anti-democratic, with attacks on churches and intimidation of its critics.
After the military’s actions in the past few weeks, there is no going back. For the US government, for Mohamed ElBaradei, for the Saudis and Emeratis, for everyone who was on board with the interim government, the chance for a settlement between the post-coup regime and the Brotherhood has evaporated. The majority either backs the military or the Brotherhood. Excluded from politics, the Brotherhood and its supporters will become more radicalised.
The military is playing to its base, which views the Brotherhood as a threat. The few who hoped to bridge the gap between the two sides can no longer play a role. The best that can be said is that Egypt is not Syria – civil war is unlikely. The military retains sufficient power to ensure the country stays together. It can put a floor under potential instability.
While Washington has had virtually no influence on developments in Egypt over the past six weeks, it does have leverage. If it wants to push the government to end the crackdowns and commit to free, fair elections and real transition by a near-term date, it could threaten to rescind aid or suspend military co-operation. Today, army commander General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is far too distracted to be concerned with or influenced by the US. But it will eventually matter to Egypt – and it would immediately send a signal to other powers.
Whether the US would really be willing to make good on these threats – moves that could leave Egypt’s military less equipped to maintain stability – is another story. Based on Mr Obama’s comments on Thursday, he will cling to the status quo as long as it remains acceptable. In Syria, the US has dragged its feet in providing support to the opposition. In Egypt it will drag its feet in unwinding its support of the military. In Syria, central authority has eroded into chaos, with neither side able to take firm control of the country. In Egypt, the recent chaos has exposed that a central authority has had firm control all along.
The Egypt spring was always a lofty goal, requiring the military, the Muslim Brotherhood and Mr Morsi not to drop the baton. All three did. And by being too passive, the US didn’t do them any favours. After this week, any flicker of hope that the Egypt spring is within reach has been extinguished.

Ian Bremmer writer is president of Eurasia Group

Kevin H O’Rourke: Why economics needs economic history

Reflexão importante do Kevin H O’Rourke, Chichele Professor of Economic History do All Souls College na University of Oxford. É importante observar que no grande bananão a historia econômica é dominada pelo marxismo o que, felizmente, não ocorre no resto do mundo. Há alguns trabalhos bons nesta linha de pesquisa mas não me parece serem eles a referência do renomado historiador da nova escola de história econômica. É urgente a derrubada do muro ideológio que exclui da produção não marxista da lista de leitura obrigatoria das disciplinas de historia econômica nos cursos de graduação em economia.




The current economic and financial crisis has given rise to a vigorous debate about the state of economics, and the training which graduate and undergraduates economics students are receiving. Importantly, among those arguing most strongly for a change in the way that young economists are trained are the ultimate employers of these students, in both the private and the public sector. Employers are increasingly complaining that young economists don’t understand how the financial system actually works, and are ill-prepared to think about appropriate policies at a time of crisis.

Strikingly, many employers and policymakers are also arguing that knowledge of economic history might be particularly useful.

Stephen King, Group Chief Economist at HSBC, argues that: “Too few economists newly arriving in the financial world have any real knowledge of events that, while sometimes in the distant past, may have tremendous relevance for current affairs…The global financial crisis can be more easily interpreted and understood by someone who has prior knowledge about the 1929 crash, the Great Depression and, for that matter, the 1907 crash” (Coyle 2012).
Andrew Haldane, Executive Director for Financial Stability at the Bank of England, has written that “financial history should have caused us to take credit cycles seriously,” and that the disappearance of subfields such as economic and financial history, as well as money, banking and finance, from the core curriculum contributed to the neglect of such factors among policymakers, a mistake that “now needs to be corrected” (Coyle 2012, pp).
In a recent Humanitas Lecture in Oxford, Stan Fischer said that “I think I’ve learned as much from studying the history of central banking as I have from knowing the theory of central banking and I advise all of you who want to be central bankers to read the history books” (2013).

The benefits of trying to understand economic history

Knowledge of economic and financial history is crucial in thinking about the economy in several ways.
Most obviously, it forces students to recognise that major discontinuities in economic performance and economic policy regimes have occurred many times in the past, and may therefore occur again in the future. These discontinuities have often coincided with economic and financial crises, which therefore cannot be assumed away as theoretically impossible. A historical training would immunise students from the complacency that characterised the “Great Moderation”. Zoom out, and that swan may not seem so black after all.

A second, related point is that economic history teaches students the importance of context.
As Robert Solow points out, “the proper choice of a model depends on the institutional context” (Solow 1985, p. 329), and this is also true of the proper choice of policies. Furthermore, the 'right' institution may itself depend on context. History is replete with examples of institutions which developed to solve the problems of one era, but which later became problems in their own right.

Third, economic history is an unapologetically empirical field, exclusively dedicated to understanding the real world.
Doing economic history forces students to add to the technical rigor of their programs an extra dimension of rigor: asking whether their explanations for historical events actually fit the facts or not. Which emphatically does not mean cherry-picking selected facts that fit your thesis and ignoring all the ones that don't: the world is a complicated place, and economists should be trained to recognise this. An exposure to economic history leads to an empirical frame of mind, and a willingness to admit that one’s particular theoretical framework may not always work in explaining the real world. These are essential mental habits for young economists wishing to apply their skills in the work environment, and, one hopes, in academia as well.

Fourth, economic history is a rich source of informal theorising about the real world, which can help motivate more formal theoretical work later on (Wren-Lewis 2013).
Habakkuk (1962) and Abramowitz (1986) are two examples that immediately spring to mind, but there are many others.

Fifth, even once the current economic and financial crisis has passed, the major long run challenges facing the world will still remain.
Among these is the question of how to rescue billions of our fellow human beings from poverty that would seem intolerable to those of us living in the OECD. And yet such poverty has been the lot of the vast majority of mankind over the vast majority of history: what is surprising is not the fact that 'they are so poor', but the fact that 'we are so rich'. In order to understand the latter puzzle, we have to turn to the historical record. What gave rise to modern economic growth is the question that prompted the birth of economic history in the first place, and it remains as relevant today as it was in the late nineteenth century. Apart from issues such as the rise of Asia and the relative decline of the West, other long run issues that would benefit from being framed in a long-term perspective include global warming, the future of globalisation, and the question of how rapidly we can expect the technological frontier to advance in the decades ahead.

Sixth, economic theory itself has been emphasising – for well over 20 years now – that path dependence is ubiquitous (David 1985).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of an undergraduate economics instructor, economic history is a great way of convincing undergraduates that the theory they are learning in their micro and macro classes is useful in helping them make sense of the real world.
Far from being seen as a 'soft' alternative to theory, economic history should be seen as an essential pedagogical complement. There is nothing as satisfying as seeing undergraduates realise that a little bit of simple theory can help them understand complicated real world phenomena. Think of Obstfeld and Taylor’s use of the Mundell-Fleming trilemma to frame students’ understanding of the history of international capital market integration over the last 150 years; or Ronald Rogowski’s use of Heckscher-Ohlin theory to discuss political cleavages the world around in the late nineteenth century; or the Domar thesis, referred to in Temin (2013), which is a great way to talk to students about what drives diminishing returns to labour. Economic history is replete with such opportunities for instructors trying to motivate their students.

References

Abramovitz, M (1986), “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind,” Journal of Economic History 46, 385-406.

Coyle, D (2012), What’s the Use of Economics?: Teaching the Dismal Science After the Crisis, London Publishing Partnership.

David, P A (1985), "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY." The American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 75, 332-37.

Fischer, S (2013), video, quotation begins at 43.48, available online at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Y-ZhFbw2H4.

Habakkuk, H J (1962), American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press.

Solow, R (1985), “Economic History and Economics,” The American Economic Review 75, 328-31

Temin, P (2013), “The Rise and Fall of Economic History at MIT,” MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 13-11 (June).

Wren-Lewis, S (2013), “Economic History and Krugman’s Crib Sheet”.

Gideon Rachman: Tragedy in Egypt

The bloodshed on the streets of Egypt is a disaster for the country. It also creates a desperate dilemma for the West.

Nobody yet knows how many people have been killed. But the random nature of some of the victims – a British television cameraman, a 17-year-old-girl – suggests that the death toll will be very high. Beyond the immediate tragedy, the killings in Cairo end the prospect of any reconciliation between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. They also end any hopes for a democratic Egypt, at least in the immediate future. That vision – which seemed almost irresistible after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak in early 2011 – is now over.

Egypt may hold elections, at some point. But it is inconceivable that the army – having effectively declared war on the Muslim Brotherhood – will risk allowing them to win elections, again. Many Egyptian commentators argue that the Brotherhood are, anyway, much less popular than when President Morsi won election. But it seems highly improbable that the army will risk testing that proposition at the ballot box. If Egypt has any elections in the near future, they will be a sham. Repression of the Muslim Brotherhood is also bound to mean mass arrests and censorship. Earlier this month, John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, said that the military’s intervention had been intended to restore democracy. But the idea of a liberal coup was always an illusion.
Yet a return to a new version of the Mubarak regime will also be very hard to achieve. Too much has happened in the last two years to make that plausible. Under Mubarak, the Brotherhood were kept well away from real power – but were part of Egyptian society, performing social work in the slums and organising at universities. It seems unlikely that they will be granted that latitude in future. Nor, after the overthrow of an elected president and mass killings on the streets, are the Islamists likely to reconcile themselves to military rule. A resurgence of violent Jihadism – followed by further repression – seems likely. Egypt’s liberals, so prominent in the original Tahrir movement, will not know which way to turn.

The US and Europe are also in a huge quandary. Some pose the dilemma as a face-off between principles and interests. According to this theory, Western principles point to support for democracy and a severance of ties with the military government. Western interests point to tacit support for the repression of an Islamist government.

But, in reality, things are more complicated than that. If the repression leads to a resurgence of al-Qaeda and the Islamist threat, it is emphatically not in western interests. Backing a violent, anti-democratic coup would also rip the coherence out of any western approach to the Middle East – or indeed the world. If the US and Europe do not harshly condemn events in Egypt, how can they continue to condemn the Assad regime’s war in Syria? It is true that there is a question of scale. Around 100,000 may have died in Syria – while the death toll in Egypt so far probably runs into hundreds. But the principle of violent repression seems similar. A failure to convincingly repudiate the military government in Egypt also creates dilemmas beyond the Middle East. How can the US or Europe condemn milder crackdowns in Russia or China, if they tolerate events in Egypt?

Yet severing ties with the Egyptian military government would pose its own set of dilemmas. The Egyptian economy is teetering and the country is clearly at risk of severe civil strife – or even civil war. If the West simply backs off now, would it find itself as powerless to influence events as it is in Syria? And if so, who or what would fill the vacuum of outside influence? The Saudis, the Qataris, a revived Brotherhood, al-Qaeda?

There simply are no easy answers to these questions, which is why all that was heard from western capitals – as events unfolded in Cairo – was confused spluttering.

Gideon Rachman

Fonte: FT

Quentin Peel: Germany’s election campaign becomes tale of colour coalitions

Ótimo artigo do Peel sobre a campanha eleitoral na Alemanha que, como já mencionado em outros posts, é um evento político mais importante, neste semestre, na zona do euro.


Whatever happens in the German election campaign over the next five-and-a-half weeks, the outcome will almost certainly be for another coalition government.
Although Angela Merkel is the most popular politician in Germany, and her Christian Democratic Union is the front-running political party, it would be an extraordinary upset for the CDU – with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union – to win an outright majority. It is currently earning steady 40 per cent support in opinion polls, some 6-7 per cent short of the threshold required to gain outright control of the Bundestag.
At this point in the election campaign, however, the game politicians play is to deny they have any intention of taking part in any coalition other than their first preference.
So Ms Merkel is adamant that she wants to keep her present centre-right coalition with the liberal Free Democrats, although its record over the past four years has been very patchy. Constant bickering, especially between the FDP and the conservative CSU, has made the “black-yellow” coalition (named after the respective party colours) much less popular than its constituent parts.
On the left, the Social Democratic party (SPD) and the environmentalist Greens insist that a "red-green” coalition remains their absolute ambition, even though they are currently polling a combined 40 per cent, well short of the majority threshold.
The man who has now put the cat among the pigeons is Gregor Gysi, the sharp-witted and silver-tongued former Communist lawyer who leads the radical Linke – the Left party – in the election campaign. He declared last week that he would happily take part in a “red-red-green” alliance to replace Ms Merkel.
His proposal has been scornfully dismissed by both potential partners. Indeed, the prospect of a “red-red-green” government is precisely the socialist scenario being presented by Ms Merkel and her allies as the horror alternative to their safe and boring conservative partnership.
Peer Steinbrück, the SPD candidate for chancellor, is tired of denying that he will ever countenance such a connection. His argument is that Germany must be a stable international partner – for solving the eurozone crisis, and in the Nato alliance. But the Left party is anti-Nato and anti-EU. The Greens say much the same.
But if neither black-yellow nor red-green coalitions has a clear majority, what is the alternative?
A “grand coalition” of CDU and SPD is the one most Germans (52 per cent in a recent poll) would favour – and most of the outside world. Mr Steinbrück admits it is what Washington, London and most of the rest of the EU would like to see. But he is flatly against it.
From the start of the campaign, he has said he would not serve under Ms Merkel in such a “black-red” alliance, although he was finance minister in the grand coalition she headed from 2005-09. He also fears it would split the SPD.
Sigmar Gabriel, the SPD chairman, has said the party should have a national convention to decide on September 23, immediately after polling day. Other senior figures favour a party referendum. The chances are that grassroots members would opt to stay in opposition, bitterly remembering that they slumped to their worst postwar result – just 23 per cent – in the 2009 election.
Another option would be “black-green” – an alliance between Ms Merkel’s Christian Democrats and the Greens. There is a vocal minority in both parties that would like to try it, although Ms Merkel has described “black-green” as a “crazy idea”.
There is a deep cultural divide between the parties. The Greens have their roots in the student protest movement of the 1960s, which was a revolt against their parents’ party – the CDU. The bitterness remains on both sides. Senior Greens fear they would lose up to 30 per cent of their party members.
The only potential coalition that might see Mr Steinbrück as chancellor would be a so-called “traffic light” coalition of SPD, Greens and FDP (red, green and yellow). If a grand coalition is out, and so is black-green and red-red-green, it might be the one workable option.
Rainer Brüderle, head of the FDP election list, says it is out of the question. SPD and Greens want higher taxes, he says, while the liberals are fiercely opposed.
All of the current denials should be taken with a pinch of salt, however. When the post-election haggling begins, all the options will become possible.

Quentin Peel

Fonte: FT

Pondé: A noite escura de Terrence Malick

Confesso que deixou de ser um prazer ler os artigos do meu colega Ponde: tornou-se, infelizmente, uma tortura. Não é o caso do artigo abaixo. Nele reaparece o humanista dos primeiros trabalhos na Folha. É um ótimo retorno.


"Amor Pleno", novo filme de Terrence Malick, é um exemplo do que o místico espanhol do século 16 San Juan de la Cruz chamou de "noite escura da alma". Não é à toa que o padre (Javier Bardem) tem um discurso muito colado ao do místico espanhol. Ele é o personagem central da narrativa. Como sempre, sem teologia e filosofia, não se entende Terrence Malick.

Por consequência, o filme está próximo do texto bíblico "Cântico dos Cânticos", peça fundamental da literatura mística ocidental, influência marcante no místico espanhol: "Onde Te escondestes que não Te encontro, meu Deus?". No "Cânticos", o amor entre Deus e a humanidade é representado pelo amor entre um homem e uma mulher, suas agonias, prazeres e ausências. "A Noite Escura da Alma" é, como "Cânticos", um texto erótico.

"O amor de Cristo pela sua igreja é como o amor de um homem e uma mulher", diz Bardem. Eis a chave para entendermos o poema místico que é "Amor Pleno". No cristianismo, amor não é mero afeto, mas a ação que nos faz existir. Sem ele, a vida esvazia.

Nesta chave, o amor entre Ben Affleck e "suas" duas mulheres está também "sob" o véu da noite escura da alma, assim como está o amor do padre por Deus e o mundo. Ele é incapaz de amar, elas sofrem por isso.

O filme encerra com a imagem do Mont Saint-Michel, na França, local onde o casal vai no começo de seu amor. Esta abadia é símbolo da vida monástica medieval. Os filósofos vitorinos (Hugo e Ricardo da Abadia de São Vitor, século 12), em sua teoria sobre o amor, entendiam que o amor, posteriormente dito romântico, era da mesma substância do amor de Deus.

Assim como é difícil para nós mantermos o amor por Deus, é difícil sustentarmos o amor entre um homem e uma mulher. Nossa natureza "caída" não suporta o "peso" do amor. Este "peso" assume várias formas, entre elas, o compromisso com ele, principalmente no vazio que o cotidiano instaura em nosso coração e corpo sedentos.

Nossa natureza tende "para baixo", para o tédio e a insatisfação, como diz a mulher francesa no filme quando se refere às duas mulheres que existe nela: uma tende para o amor, para o alto, a outra para baixo, para a terra.

Não é à toa que ela, a francesa, após uma longa conversa com a amiga italiana, niilista e entediada, chega ao adultério, símbolo máximo do tédio e da degradação do amor. Quando nos distanciamos do amor, nos dissipamos num desejo que nos leva ao nada.

Mas, o que vem a ser esta "noite escura da alma"? Quando falamos de mística, pensamos normalmente em êxtase, em "gozo místico". Mas, a "noite escura" é o momento em que a alma, conhecedora de Deus, deixa de senti-lo no seu cotidiano, o que a leva à solidão, ao desespero e à dúvida. Uma verdadeira mística da agonia.

Neste momento, o padre lembra a máxima do Evangelho: "Você deve amar", portanto, o amor não é mero sentimento, mas sim uma ação, como é dito no filme. Agir com amor, mesmo que não sintamos o amor. Para ele, continuar cuidando dos doentes, para o casal, continuar a cuidar um do outro, porque longe do amor, somos todos doentes, umas criaturas da noite que vagam numa escuridão sem fim. No escuro, não é só o outro que desaparece, mas nós também.

O padre chega mesmo a lamentar o fato que, em seu ministério, ele deve "fingir" sentimentos que não tem, assim como um casal deve continuar a amar (esta é a condição do amor como "ação" e não mero sentimento) mesmo quando a paixão desaparece.

Quando nos sentimos longe do amor (de Deus), vemos nosso nada, isso deixa nossa alma inquieta, sedenta. Como é dito em "Árvore da Vida", filme anterior de Malick, a vida sem amor "flashes by", apenas passa. Esta é a chave para passarmos do "Árvore da Vida" ao "Amor Pleno". A responsabilidade dos que "amam menos", como diz o padre, se referindo a ele e a Ben Affleck, é maior, porque são eles que enxergam melhor o vazio no coração da vida.

Os ecos da "noite escura" atingem toda a existência, para além da teologia, adentrando a solidão nossa de cada dia. O drama maior não é não ser amado, mas ser incapaz de amar.

Luiz Felipe Pondé

Fonte: FSP

Abdullah Gul: Egypt must restore its fledgling democracy – and fast

Egypt has always been an engine of progress in its region and beyond. As the inheritor of so many great civilisations, and as the flagship of the Arab world, Egypt and its people have led by example; and the nation’s achievements, failures and changes of direction have been watched and felt not just across the Middle East and north Africa, but across the whole Islamic world.
After the January Revolution in 2011, Turkey supported the Egyptian people in their quest for freedom, democracy and honour. I was the first head of state to visit the country after that great change. Since then, Turkey has spared no effort to help consolidate the country’s fledgling democracy, and to make sure that its political system embraces all segments of its people.
I personally encouraged leaders in Egyptian politics, the military and in civil society to seize this historic opportunity to work together for the good of their nation. I urged moderation, restraint, patience, perseverance and – most importantly – inclusiveness. I also stressed the need for economic revival; Turkey’s support for Egypt’s economy was intended to make sure that Egyptians could feel the benefit of the new era in their daily lives.
Unfortunately, the historic step towards democracy failed in less than two years. The coup that ousted Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, was a clear derailment of the country’s progress. Perhaps the deadlock could have been avoided. Maybe this situation could have been averted by calling for early elections. But problems should, in any case, have been corrected through democratic mechanisms.
Our own experience has taught us how important it is to keep those mechanisms functioning and to remain committed to open democratic values. This is not a mantra only for the good times. At moments of peril, it is more important than ever to stick closely to the democratic path.
Egypt is now going through a delicate process that will define not only its own future, but also the fates of young democracies emerging after the Arab spring. During this critical time, every possible step towards either reconciliation or further fragmentation will leave its mark on the future course of both the country and the region. The significance of constructive and well-articulated steps to be taken now by all the relevant parties, inside and outside Egypt, is obvious.
The Egyptian people have almost been split into two camps, each of which is rallying dangerously against the other. This situation is worrying and unsustainable. Already, scores of people have lost their lives during demonstrations on streets and squares. What we need now in Egypt is not a people divided against themselves, but a nation rallying around its future. Daunting economic and social problems can only be overcome if Egyptians join their efforts together and do not spend their energy on political division.
Egypt’s future lies in democracy, where the free will of the Egyptian people prevails, constitutional legitimacy is upheld and where rights and freedoms are guaranteed. No other solution will be right for Egypt – and nothing short of it will bring stability. That is why everyone must do their utmost to win a democratic future for the country. Under the current circumstances, it faces a risk of further polarisation.
At this juncture, I believe the following steps are vital to put democracy back on track. First, a quick return to democracy – which was the aim of the revolution – through an inclusive transition process, is of utmost importance. Second, all political groups should be allowed to take part in the forthcoming elections. The exclusion of any political party will undermine the success of the ensuing period. Third, release of Mr Morsi and his fellow politicians would make a tremendous contribution to reconciliation and stability. Fourth, everyone should exercise restraint to avoid further casualties. Further loss of life could make recovery unattainable, even if the leaders in Egypt act with their best intentions to break the deadlock.
Turkey will do what it can to bolster its relations with Egypt, in light of our strong cultural ties – and to help Egyptians keep their country on a democratic path. They deserve a much brighter future. Let us all work to win a bright future for this great nation that is so dear to us.

Abdullah Gul is president of Turkey

Fonte: FT

Chris Hanretty: Letta has survived, but now must start to govern

Bom artigo sobre o governo italiano. Vale a leitura


This week, to mark 100 days in office, Enrico Letta’s Italian government released an electronic booklet and companion website detailing the administration’s achievements. Alas, for some readers, it showed up as white text on a white background. As heavy-handed political metaphors go, it was hard to beat. A polling company, SWG, recently asked Italians what they remembered most about the Letta government. Almost two-fifths could recall nothing at all.
In truth, the government’s main achievement has been survival. It is unfortunate that this achievement is worth mentioning. The February election was one of the most volatile in west European electoral history, and led many commentators to predict fresh elections either before or shortly after the summer break.
Notwithstanding Silvio Berlusconi’s recent conviction for tax fraud, and a temptation on both sides of the political spectrum to call fresh elections, it now seems more likely that the government will last at least until European elections next year. Mr Letta benefits from the electoral system, which requires a coalition to sweep the board in a series of regional contests to win majorities in both chambers. Neither left nor right is polling well enough to do so.
A secondary achievement has been reassuring the EU. Shortly after the government’s formation, Italy left the European naughty step: the club of member states placed under the commission’s excessive deficit procedure. Though this boon was only secured thanks to decisions taken by his predecessor, Mario Monti, Mr Letta has, whether through charm or ubiquity (the white-on-white booklet mentions his extensive travels), achieved for Italy a degree of consideration that a François Hollande or a Mariano Rajoy might envy.
Nevertheless, many Italian governments have survived without governing. Over the next 100 days the government faces three particular challenges. First, it must deal with the fallout from Berlusconi’s conviction and his likely expulsion from parliament. That will not mean that Berlusconi will be powerless. He has only been convicted, not disgraced. Members of his party will continue to further what they perceive as his interests. Even when in power, Berlusconi always preferred to conduct business from his private residences in Rome and Milan. The flow of self-interested courtiers to Palazzo Grazioli and Arcore respectively will not dry up, and demands made by Berlusconi will be pursued by his ministers.
Second, the government should deal with electoral reform before the constitutional court is called upon to act. Three parties dominate the Italian political scene: the centre-left Democratic party, of which Mr Letta is a member; Berlusconi’s People of Freedom; and the anti-system Five Star Movement. These mutually antagonistic parties together command about three-quarters of the votes. No electoral system can guarantee a coherent majority given this distribution of support. But a proportional system with a high minimum representation threshold of 5 per cent would simplify post-electoral coalition formation.
Reform may be easier now that it is clear Berlusconi will not take top place on any electoral list (a law passed under the Monti government means Berlusconi is already barred from standing for office in any fresh elections). But, sadly, the reform that stands the greatest chance of permitting a coherent majority – the abolition or reform of the Senate, which currently duplicates the powers of the lower chamber, meaning that the government must have a majority in both chambers – would require constitutional amendments that could not realistically be passed within the 18-month timeframe Mr Letta set out in his inaugural speech.
Finally, the government must, by the end of the month, deal with taxation. Berlusconi’s party has demanded the abolition of a particularly disliked local property tax. Though unpopular, it is the right tax for Italy: it is not easily evaded; it does not distort labour markets; and it falls on the established rather than the young un- or underemployed. Italy already takes less tax from property than the developed-world average. Mr Letta should attempt to preserve it.
If the government survives the next 100 days, it will have to tackle the factors behind Italy’s dismal growth record. At some point, it will be told to reform the labour market – the third rail of Italian politics. Blaming the labour market is too easy. Self-serving regulation in product and service markets is far more important. The Monti government had to battle against notaries, pharmacists, taxi drivers and petrol station owners in its drive to make entry into those markets easier. It was only partly successful. The Letta government can do more. This will be difficult, and is the work of more than one hundred days. Italians should hope it is not the work of a thousand.

Chris Hanretty teaches politics at the University of East Anglia

Scott Sumner: Why Obama should not pick Summers for the Fed

Analise bem interessante. Vale a leitura.

The debate over the relative merits of the candidates for the position of chair of the US Federal Reserve has revolved around two issues: who is the most dovish, and who would be the more aggressive regulator. But this misses the most important question: which of the frontrunners – Janet Yellen, Fed vice-chair, and Lawrence Summers, former Treasury secretary, – can most effectively do monetary policy with interest rates at the zero bound?
Ben Bernanke, the current chair, has always insisted monetary policy remains effective when rates fall to zero, and has implemented several unconventional policies. Ms Yellen supports those policies and might even be a bit more aggressive. But Professor Summers has argued that the Fed may not be able to control aggregate demand once interest rates hit zero, and therefore that we need to rely on fiscal stimulus.
Even worse, he has warned that policies such as quantitative easing and low interest rates threaten to create malinvestment and new asset bubbles. Admittedly Prof Summers is not likely to reverse immediately current policy; but should we be reassured that his defenders claim that he will not immediately implement his bad ideas?
In a recent paper, Christina Romer (a professor at the University of California, Berkeley, who should be on President Barack Obama’s shortlist) and David Romer pointed out that, through its history, the Fed’s three main policy errors have shared an underlying cause: economists were too pessimistic about the ability of monetary policy to control nominal spending.
During the Great Depression, US nominal gross domestic product halved, and yet relatively few economists blamed the Fed or believed that monetary policy could solve the problem. Today we know the Fed could have, and should have, done much more.
The second big error occurred during 1966-81, when the Fed lost control of inflation. At the time, most economists failed to understand the essential role of monetary policy in controlling inflation, and were sceptical that tight money could fix the problem. They blamed everything from food and oil price shocks to overly powerful labour unions, and called for “incomes policies” to control inflation. But it was only when central banks adopted the “Taylor Principle” that they were able to bring inflation down and keep it at low levels. Today inflation is the least of our problems.
The third failure was much less severe than the first two but still quite costly. The Fed allowed nominal spending to plunge in late 2008, and then refused to promise to try to return spending to the previous trend line. As expectations of nominal growth fell sharply, nominal interest rates fell to zero and conventional monetary policy became powerless. Some of Prof Summers’ supporters claim his personality would be effective in a crisis. But that’s what worries me.
After Lehman Brothers failed, the Fed and the administration focused their attention on the banking crisis, and totally ignored the continuing collapse of demand, which was less obvious. Those who think they recall what happened in late 2008 may be shocked to be told that the Fed refused to cut rates in the meeting two days after the bank collapsed, leaving them at 2 per cent. In retrospect, they should have been cut to zero, as the economy was clearly plunging into recession and five-year inflation expectations had fallen to 1.23 per cent. A dose of QE plus “forward guidance” should immediately have been adopted.
Prof Summers is a brilliant economist and would probably display outstanding leadership skills in a banking crisis. But that is not what we need in a 21st century central banker. The most important monetary trend of the past 30 years is the relentless decline in real yields on Treasury bonds, from 7 per cent to roughly zero. We can debate the causes of the decline, but there is no evidence that it will turn around soon. That means the US economy is likely to hit the zero bound in future recessions, again and again.
If the Fed is as passive as it was in 2008, the recessions may end up being needlessly severe, regardless of how decisively we address banking panics. If Prof Summers replaces Mr Bernanke, we are likely to see more policy passivity. Prof Summers claims the solution at the zero bound is fiscal stimulus, but that is far too weak to prevent an economy from falling into a severe recession.
Would you want a ship’s captain who did not believe that turning the wheel would change the direction of a ship? Especially when the financial markets are telling us not only that monetary policy is important but also that there is nothing more important in terms of the economy’s medium-term direction.

Scott Sumner is an economist at Bentley University

Fonte: FT

Adam Posen: The global economy is now distinctly Victorian

Analise interessante e bem otimista sobre a economia mundial.


The global economy is getting back to normal. That does not mean a rapid return to full employment nor to a low-risk world for investors. It means that the underlying realities of globalisation are becoming clearer: ours is a multipolar world, where the technological convergence between rich nations and capable poor ones is rapid. Middle classes are expanding quickly in emerging markets – a group that politicians focus on everywhere, while ignoring recurrent protests from others, particularly low-skilled labour. The world has and will have high real economic volatility despite relative price stability. This state of affairs is, in fact, a return to the Old Normal of the late 19th century. It is a world that we can understand, even if we do not like it.
In international politics, as has long been foretold, the “American century” of 1945-2000 has given way to a world where the US remains the leader but is losing dominance. So the global system is somewhere between outright conflict and smooth international governance. Reflecting this diffusion of economic and military dominance, a few major currencies – not just one – are increasingly being used for invoicing and reserve management, and that trend will only continue.
The link between currency usage and geopolitical ties is strong, and so the dollar will not be suddenly displaced, but regional alternatives will continue to rise. This has a feel of the 19th century: as Barry Eichengreen, a professor at the University of California, Berkeley has argued, there have been long periods of history where multiple reserve currencies coexisted, like at the end of the 1800s, and we are now in one of those periods – which contributes to economic volatility and uncertainty for national economies and investors.
This multipolar world is also one where no one has sufficient authority to fully protect global public goods, such as intellectual property rights. A weakening of those protections will increase the pace at which emerging markets capable of converging will catch up with advanced economies. Some see this trend as a result of China’s rise or digital piracy, but remember that Germany and the US reverse engineered British innovations in the Victorian age, and even pirated the IP of Charles Dickens and Arthur Conan Doyle.
At the same time, a lack of IP protection reduces incentives to invest in innovation, as Elhanan Helpman of Harvard has demonstrated. So the technological leaders will advance more slowly, which will also boost catch-up. This, in turn, will erode the relative power of the US and other advanced economies, further reducing their ability to enforce IP rules. The whole cycle will increase competitive pressure on incumbent multinational businesses.
Active national rivalries, multiple reserve currencies, eroding intellectual property rights and increased corporate competition in many industries will increase volatility of the real economy and diminish investment. Large state-backed national infrastructure projects, as dominated late 19th century development, will be a growing asset class as a result. The division between investments yielding safer low returns and speculative higher-return assets will be quite sharp.
But as was the case from the 1840s until the first world war, today’s convergence and competition – and the volatility that results – can and I believe will persist for a long time without globalisation breaking down. It held up for a long time then because, even as there were arms races and conflicts, France and Germany, let alone the UK and the US, had an interest in maintaining the status quo. And, as then, today’s dominant powers wish to maintain their legitimacy against non-state actors, including terrorists and revolutionaries, and preserve cross-border flows of trade and finance.
Furthermore, politicians are responsive to their own upper middle classes, whose wellbeing depends upon maintaining globalisation and keeping international disputes within limits. These groups are also creditors whose desires for price stability, combined with the pressures from currency competition, creates strong incentives for keeping inflation low. On average, such motivations will dominate over temptations to inflate their problems away. So, just as most countries usually adhered to the gold standard over a century ago, they will stick with independence for their central banks and fiscal consolidation now.
There was little or no response to recurring spasms of protest or calls for radical change by low-skilled workers in the 19th century, except when mass movements were assimilated into mainstream political parties with support from the elites. Something similar is at work today, with the protests of southern Europe and the demands of the Occupy movement largely ignored by policy makers catering to the voters of the (older) bourgeoisie.
The Old Normal is thus a tale of the global economy returning to unfettered markets in many ways, and – at the national level – to more volatile economic conditions with slower average growth as a result. This is a situation which I am predicting, not endorsing. While domestic politics and international relations have changed greatly since 1914, the creation of safety nets and welfare states (even if now curtailed), and the development of nuclear deterrence among the major powers only strengthen the status quo bias of the current governments.
The Old Normal is not nice, but it is likely to last.

Adam Posen is president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics

Fonte: FT

Josef Joffe: Merkel will do whatever it takes to stay in power

As eleições na Alemanha é seguramente o evento mais importante na agenda europeia neste segundo semestre. Joffe apresenta um retrato bem interessante da Merkel, a grande favorita nesta eleição que, no entanto, poderá ser obrigada a governar em coalizão com a oposição social democrata.

Never try to call an election in the autumn by invoking the polls of the summer. Western voters have shed iron-clad party loyalties; classic predictors like faith, class, and city-dwelling are as reliable as the weather report. And yet, Angela Merkel’s Christian Democrats are holding steady at 42 per cent, up from 34 in the 2009 contest. This is a shade more than the combined take of the “Red-and-Green” opposition of the Social Democrats and Greens. She is heading for four more years.
What about her junior partner, the liberal FDP? They are hanging in there at 5 per cent, the minimum for representation in the Bundestag? Not to worry. Though Germans sniff at these free-marketeers, they vote for them in the end, if only to hold off the greater evil of the high-tax nanny state offered by the Red-and-Green alternative.
In the last two regional state elections, the FDP entered the home-stretch polling at four per cent, but emerged with twice as much on election day. If the FDP score six per cent, Ms Merkel can look forward to a total of twelve years in power – one more than Margaret Thatcher.
The two ladies could not be more different. Thatcher loved to polarize and to go straight for the jugular. Ms Merkel, a woman whose soft demeanour conceals a razor-sharp mind, is the ultimate survivor. She smells threats before they materialise; if she can’t deflect them, she will ride them – never mind her previous convictions. When Fukushima erupted, she decreed a shutdown for German’s reactors – even though she had just pleased the utilities by extending their operational lives. She announced the Energiewende – a U-turn toward the Promised Land where only “sustainable” energy would flow.
Ms Merkel is deliciously diffuse in her rhetoric, loath to commit, ready to ditch inopportune policies. Lest this sound like rank opportunism, there is strategy behind the tactics. The technical term is “asymmetric demobilization” – the very opposite of what politicos normally do in the battle of the ballots. The classic campaign textbook orders are get your ducks in a row, rouse your supporters and drag them to the polling stations. This is how Social Democrat Gerhard Schröder did it in 2002 when he trained his anti-American guns on George W Bush in the run-up to the Iraq war (his opponent was 12 points ahead in the summer). Ms Merkel’s plan is to lull the other side; don’t rile them and win by keeping them at home.
How did she do it after the near-disaster of 2005, when she squeaked by with a few thousand votes? By shifting to the left. An apostle of free markets and low taxes ten years ago, Merkel simply outflanked the left on the left. She has yielded to same-sex marriage and gender quotas. She has showered the populace with social-welfare goodies, cutting defence spending more rapidly than France and Britain. She is the best Social Democrat the SPD could have asked for. For them, the only downside is that she is in the wrong party.
Will the National Security Agency’s snooping in Germany do for Ms Merkel in between now and 22 September? The polls say no; her lead has been holding steady, even increasing slightly. The NSA, as political scientists have it, is a “low salience” issue. Also, the Red-and-Green parties can’t make too much hay on the NSA’s digital assault. Both were in charge until 2005, and the social democrats were part of Merkel’s cabinet until 2009. When they were in charge, they savoured the fruits of the American tree.
Apart from Merkel’s jiu-jitsu tactics and leftward-ho strategy, her greatest asset is Peer Steinbrück, the Social Democrats’ candidate for the chancellory. He is an honourable and sharp-tongued man, but was born with a foot in his mouth. His jokes backfire and his trenchant arguments fall flat; he cannot pluck heartstrings. If Germans could elect their chief executive directly, 58 per cent would vote for Merkel and only 27 for Steinbrück – a big drop from almost neck-and-neck a year ago. In the end, it is the politicians, not the parties, who tilt the scales.
Ms Merkel is just what the doctor ordered for the German soul. She may not enthral, let alone amuse people. But what her enemies call “opportunism” is precisely her biggest advantage. People need not fear her. She won’t demand too much; she won’t go into a sudden lurch (except for the Energiewende, which catered to German nuclear angst). She will follow or ride the mood of the electorate, never surprising them with ideas that would trigger resentment. She will hold steady. But only so long as resistance does not turn into anger. If that happens, she will yield before displeasure turns into hostility.
This is why she will be Germany’s next chancellor – unless something happens. In that case, go back to the first sentence. Never call a September election on the basis of summer polls.

Josef Joffe is editor of Die Zeit and a fellow of the Hoover Institution at Stanford University

Pope Francis: Mass appeal

When Jorge Mario Bergoglio joined the Jesuit community in the Argentine city of Córdoba in the early 1990s, the roof of the college needed fixing but the finances were in a terrible state and the priests could not afford it. Less than two years later, when he left to become auxiliary archbishop of Buenos Aires, the roof was repaired and there was not a single peso of debt.
Twenty years later, following his election in March to succeed Benedict XVI, Pope Francis has much more than a leaky roof to repair, both inside and outside the Vatican walls.
After seven days in front of rapturous crowds in Brazil, culminating in a mass attended by some 3m people on Copacabana beach, Francis is set to dedicate the next few months to the biggest overhaul of the Church in decades. Some are calling it a revolution.
He has assumed the leadership of a Church whose authority has been compromised by corruption and paedophile priests. Implementing reforms will entail transforming the Curia, the Vatican’s Byzantine administration. Francis will also have to restructure the Vatican bank, which has been mired in scandals centred on suspected money laundering.
“The Church must not be scared of renovating the old structures,” Pope Francis said in a morning homily last month in the Vatican guesthouse of Santa Marta, where he chose to live after shunning the papal apartment used by his predecessors.
But tackling entrenched power is a daunting task and Francis is still an untested quantity. His approach to these reforms is being viewed as one that suggests quiet, determined pragmatism rather than zeal. He has begun the process by nominating three commissions – the most important being a committee of eight cardinals – to provide a blueprint for the reforms.
Andrea Gagliarducci, a young Catholic commentator, says Francis is taking an approach “typical of the Jesuits to confront and resolve problems” that was employed in Latin America.
This air of humility is rapidly winning him authority. It is also seen as a crucial first step politically, helping him to build credibility and popularity before his difficult next moves.
As a cardinal in Argentina, Francis had already planned his retirement: in room 13 of a priests’ residence in the central barrio of Flores where he grew up in an immigrant family. Had he not become pope, he would have been living in a spartan room with no air conditioning with a storeroom as a study by the end of this year. Instead, last month the 76-year-old pontiff was carrying his own hand luggage on to the flight to Rio de Janeiro.
Cardinal Timothy Dolan, archbishop of New York, told the National Catholic Reporter that he had been surprised by the extent to which Francis had been accepted as a modest parish priest. He has visited Muslim migrants on the Italian island of Lampedusa and has drunk coffee in a humble home in Rio’s Varginha favela – acts that represent a break with the past.
“We wanted somebody with dirty boots because he’s used to going through the sheep fields. We got that, and we got it in spades,” said Cardinal Dolan. “We wanted someone with good managerial and leadership skills . . . It’s a little bit of a surprise that he hasn’t played his hand on that front yet. However, I think that’s part of his strategy.” He added that he expected Francis to embark on more substantive reform “after the summer lull”.
Dino Boffo, editor of TV2000, a television network owned by the Italian bishops’ conference, says: “The Pope is picking up where Benedict had left off because he was not able to deliver the change that was absolutely necessary.”
The pope’s style, after his more remote and academic predecessor, has already drawn vast crowds to Saint Peter’s square and rekindled interest in a Church that had been perceived as out of touch with its more than 1bn faithful. In his native Argentina, Francis had faced some criticism for not doing more to protect two Jesuit priests detained and tortured by the military junta in the 1970s but he has insisted that he did everything he could. More than 80 per cent of Italians are struck by his simplicity and trust him, while 58 per cent believe that his election will contribute to the Church’s renewal, according to a poll conducted by Demopolis.
Despite this support, Francis concedes that he has his work cut out as he prepares to tackle the interest groups that dominate the Vatican, including a gay lobby. His biggest opposition is thought to come from so-called traditionalists who consider Francis a usurper from outside the Vatican’s inner circle.
A first step in tackling his opponents will be the retirement, expected in September, of Tarcisio Bertone, the Vatican’s powerful secretary of state. “After Bertone everything will change. It will be a gradual but complete change of all the main positions in the Curia’s institutions,” said a person close to the process.
With Cardinal Bertone’s departure, the role of secretary of state will be downgraded to a simpler administrative position. But his departure does not make the pope’s task less formidable. “Some people are asking whether Bergoglio’s communicative abilities will translate into the same ability in making managerial decisions. That’s the challenge and the result cannot be taken for granted,” said Massimo Franco, a Vatican expert and author, pointing out that the appointment of the new secretary of state will still be pivotal in reforming the Curia.
Monsignor Claudio Celli, head of the Pontifical Council for Social Communications, expects Francis will follow the approaches laid out in the Second Vatican Council and demonstrate that the papacy is not an absolute monarchy, meaning that the pope will involve bishops around the world in his decisions.
Francis, however, has admitted that he does not yet know how to go about confronting what could be his most delicate task: reforming the Institute for Religious Works, the Vatican bank.
“Whatever the solution, it must have transparency and honesty,” he said on his return from World Youth Day in Brazil in an impromptu news conference. He displayed a steelier side to his character by saying that the closure of the bank was an option.
Ernst von Freyberg, the bank president appointed under Benedict in February, has hired regulatory experts of the US Promontory Group to screen all 18,000 accounts in the IOR. A bank spokesman said the work will be “substantially finished” by the end of the year.
“If the pope keeps on saying that saints did not have bank accounts then his message is loud and clear,” said Andrea Tornielli, Vatican reporter for La Stampa, an Italian daily.
Some believe this means the bank will be reduced to its original role, after its foundation by Pius XII in 1942, to handle accounts held by orders or priests for religious works and charities, without being able to carry out banking transactions.
Pope Francis will also have to tackle other powerful economic institutions, namely the Prefecture for the Economic Affairs of the Holy See, the Administration of the Patrimony of the Holy See (APSA) and Propaganda Fide. These manage a vast and unknown quantity of properties and wealth, mostly kept off the Vatican’s official balance sheets.
These organisations have come under scrutiny following the arrest in June by Italian magistrates of a senior prelate suspected of involvement in corruption and money laundering linked to the IOR and also APSA, where he worked as an accountant.
To the outside world the most testing challenge for Francis will be to clear up and atone for decades of child sex abuse by priests and the cover-up of their crimes by their superiors.
During his in-flight press conference, Francis drew a strong distinction between homosexuality among priests – which he said was for God to judge – and criminal acts against children. He has already approved a reform to the Vatican’s outdated criminal law code introducing a clearer definition of crimes against children, including child pornography and abuse.
Outside pressure is mounting. In a document submitted on July 1, the UN committee for the rights of children has asked the Vatican to provide detailed information on all cases of child sexual abuse committed by members of the clergy to national authorities.
This request follows a law introduced by Benedict that was watered down in the Vatican so that reporting to national authorities was not made a legal requirement. The Vatican has so far not responded in public to the UN demands, and Francis’s reform of the criminal code did not address the sensitive issue of protecting the confidentiality of confessions made to priests.
Admittedly Francis’s moves have been more of style than substance, although the Jesuits’ reputation for thoroughness and pragmatism suggest serious governance reforms do lie in store even if Francis is also likely to adhere to his predecessor’s conservatism on most theological issues.
“I don’t think he will make changes to the positioning on the Church on main themes but he will certainly change the approach,” Monsignor Celli suggested diplomatically.

Giulia Segreti

Fonte: FT