Philip Stephens: Europe needs a cold war lesson in deterrence

Europe faces a realist moment. Nearly 25 years have passed since US President George HW Bush saw an opportunity for a new, liberal international order. The EU hoped the landscape would be remade in its postmodern image. The dream has been lost to systemic disorder. Myriad conflicts in the Middle East now lap at Europe’s borders. Russia’s war in Ukraine has crossed them.

There is nothing to be gained from another cold war, even if it is evident that Vladimir Putin wants to tear up the post-communist settlement in Europe. There are, however, lessons to be rescued from the decades-long confrontation with the Soviet Union. One of them is about deterrence. Politicians sedated by hopes of a world organised around international collaboration will have to wake up again to the dynamics of great power rivalry.

Francis Fukuyama was half right in declaring the end of history. Capitalism reigns supreme, but rising states such as China and declining ones such as Russia have found a new political model. Authoritarian capitalism, as the Harvard scholar Michael Ignatieff called it in this summer’s Ditchley Foundation annual lecture, presents them with an alternative to liberal democracy. As for a rules-based global system, these states prefer to dine à la carte. They take what they like and reject what is inconvenient.

Europeans have been slow to recognise the world as it is rather than as they imagined. The reaction to Russia’s march into Ukraine has made this painfully obvious. The reflex has been to seek to defuse the crisis. On one level this is admirable – war did not solve much in Iraq and Afghanistan. The snag is that ceding ground to Mr Putin does not amount to de-escalation. To the contrary, weakness stokes the Russian president’s expansionism.

The west’s priority – and the downing by Russian-backed insurgents of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 provides an opportunity – should be to recover the concept of deterrence. Not the nuclear deterrence of mutually assured destruction but the traditional understanding that political resolve and a readiness to deploy force can apply a brake. The mistake many Europeans have made – and, to a lesser degree, Barack Obama’s White House has done the same – is to confuse deterrence with escalation. I cannot count the times I have heard politicians and policy makers say they must tread carefully for fear of provoking Mr Putin.

Some of these protestations are self-serving – what these people really mean is that they do not want to jeopardise economic relationships. But there seems also to be a genuine misunderstanding about the purpose of deterrence. Imposing sanctions on Moscow will not of itself persuade Mr Putin to pull out of Ukraine. It might persuade him to think twice before marching his army into other Russian-speaking territories.

To be effective, deterrence has above all to be credible. The potential adversary has to believe that aggression will provoke proportionate retaliation, whether economic or, as a last resort, military. The sanctions imposed on Moscow by the EU have been anything but credible. Washington has gone further, but not far enough to signal serious intent. What Mr Putin has seen of a divided west tells him it is bluffing. He will take sanctions seriously when he sees that those threatening them are ready to bear the costs.

European hesitation has ceded to the Kremlin control of the public debate. The annexation of Crimea overturned the cardinal pillar of European security since 1945: states cannot extend their territory by force of arms. As such, Russia’s action represents a profound threat to the security of the continent. Yet to listen to the discussion in some European capitals is to wonder if Mr Putin is not among the victims.


Nato has a chance to remedy this when its leaders hold a summit in Newport, Wales, in September. The gathering had been intended as a stocktaking exercise after the alliance’s planned withdrawal from Afghanistan. The imperative now is to restore Nato as a solid guardian of the post-1945 security order.

Many of the things the alliance needs to do are practical. They are set out persuasively in a report published this week by the think-tank Chatham House. Nato needs to find ways of working in groupings smaller than the full membership of 28. The alliance should extend the interoperability of forces and improve planning and burden-sharing. Governments badly need to re-explain to their electorates why Nato is vital for their security. Jihadis are not the only threat.

The big danger, though, lies in the credibility deficit. Seen from Moscow, Nato looks like two-tier alliance. No one doubts its resolve to defend, say, Germany, but does the Article 5 guarantee of collective security apply equally to the states that joined after the collapse of communism? Would the US – or Britain, France, or Italy – really resist if Mr Putin turned his attention to “protecting” the Russian-speaking people of the Baltics? If the answer is no, the alliance is worthless.

The best way to make sure the commitment is never tested is to make it credible. That can be done by stationing sufficient “tripwire” forces in the east to persuade Mr Putin that a robust response to aggression would be unavoidable.

The heavy lifting, as ever, will have to be done by the US. Europe has depended since 1945 on Washington’s security guarantee and events in Ukraine suggest that is not about to change. But Europeans cannot forever be reluctant partners in their own defence. The way to avoid war is to deter aggressors.




Philip Stephens




Fonte: FT